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MOVE LAST AND TAKE THINGS: 
FACEBOOK AND PREDATORY COPYING 
Josh Obear* 
Facebook’s now decade-long dominance of the social media 
landscape stands in stark contrast with the industry’s early 
history of dynamism and disruption. The company played a key 
role in growing the social media industry from the small, niche 
communities of the early 2000s into the omnipresent societal 
force it is today. Capitalizing on this growth, Facebook pioneered 
a business model that now transforms the attention of billions of 
users into billions of dollars of advertising revenue. But for all of 
Facebook’s success, perhaps its greatest triumph has been in 
defending its golden goose from a swarm of competitors eager to 
claim a share of the profits. Countless challenges from Snapchat, 
Twitter, Google, and dozens of social network startups have all 
failed to break Facebook’s hold of the market. 
This Note argues that Facebook has exploited its market 
dominance to exclude competitors in the social media market. 
Despite complaints from competitors and business commentators, 
Facebook has so far avoided serious antitrust inquiry. By 
examining Facebook’s history, its business model, and the 
structural incentives of the social media market, one can see how 
Facebook leverages its position toward anticompetitive ends. In 
particular, this Note explores how Facebook copies the popular 
apps and features developed by its rivals in order to prevent those 
rivals from establishing a foothold in the social media market. 
This copycat strategy causes significant non-monetary consumer 
harms, such as product degradation and stifled innovation, 
currently neglected by antitrust doctrine. Facebook’s copying 
campaign highlights the need for courts to consider new 
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frameworks and theories that help identify new forms of 
anticompetitive conduct. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the social media landscape has 
experienced rapid growth, innovation, and disruption. When 
Facebook first launched in 2004, the online social media 
market was still in its infancy: Myspace, considered the 
dominant social media website of the time, was struggling to 
figure out how to effectively monetize its product, and “social 
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network ads as big business was considered a fantasy.”1 A 
mere six years later, Facebook had usurped Myspace, 
revolutionized the social media advertising model, and 
transformed itself into a billion-dollar enterprise.2 In 2017, 
Facebook reached two major milestones: two billion monthly 
visitors3 and a stock valuation of more than $500 billion.4 
Facebook’s early motto, once plastered on the office walls of 
its Menlo Park headquarters at One Hacker Way, 
encapsulates its revolution: “Move Fast and Break Things.”5 
 
1 Kevin Kelleher, How Facebook Learned from Myspace’s Mistakes, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 19, 2010), http://fortune.com/2010/11/19/how-facebook-
learned-from-myspaces-mistakes/ [https://perma.cc/2FX4-CF8W]. Despite 
News Corp’s 2005 purchase of Myspace for $580 million, Wall Street 
commentator and Business Insider co-founder Henry Blodget remarked in 
2009 that “Myspace might actually be worth next to nothing.” Emma 
Barnett, MySpace by Numbers: How It Compares to Its Rivals, TELEGRAPH 
(Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
myspace/8243403/MySpace-by-numbers-how-it-compares-to-its-rivals.html 
[https://perma.cc/MNM5-8WGR]. See infra Part III for a discussion of the 
early history of the social media business model. 
2 See Kelleher, supra note 1. 
3 Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg: 2 Billion Users Means 




4 John Shinal, Facebook Passes Amazon in Market Cap and Now Sits 
on the Brink of an Exclusive Club, CNBC (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/28/facebook-touches-500-billion-passes-
amazon.html [https://perma.cc/ZVS8-FYGU]. This milestone made 
Facebook the fourth most valuable U.S. technology firm at that time, id., in 
an era when the technology industry claimed the top five market 
capitalizations and seven of the twenty most profitable companies in the 
world. Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley’s Big Three vs. Detroit’s Golden-
Age Big Three, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/silicon-valley-big-
three/527838/ [https://perma.cc/24QN-VF85]. 
5 Nick Statt, Zuckerberg: ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Isn’t How 
Facebook Operates Anymore, CNET (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/zuckerberg-move-fast-and-break-things-isnt-
how-we-operate-anymore/ (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review). 
In 2012, Mark Zuckerberg invoked the “Move Fast and Break Things” motto 
in a letter to investors as part of Facebook’s SEC filings prior to its initial 
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Investors celebrated Facebook’s meteoric rise, but many 
other commentators have begun to question the resultant 
concentration of power. Facebook faced heavy criticism for its 
“role in spreading fake news and divisiveness” during the 
2016 U.S. presidential election,6 and even before then, many 
commentators had expressed concern about Facebook’s 
control over social discourse and its capacity for censorship.7 
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has himself 
acknowledged that “many people now believe technology only 
centralizes power rather than decentralizes it.”8 
Concerns about Facebook’s growing influence are not 
limited to the political sphere. In late 2017, Facebook 
admitted that social media use was linked with reductions in 
self-reported mental health and increases in teen depression.9 
 
public offering. See Facebook, Registration Statement (Form S-1) 67 (Feb. 
1, 2012). Facebook has since distanced itself from the motto, a move that 
some considered to be a sign of the “maturation” of the company. See Statt 
supra. As this Note argues in Part IV, this shift in Facebook’s business 
philosophy was less a show of maturity than it was an adaptation to 
Facebook’s newfound position as an entrenched monopolist. 
6 Deepa Seetharaman, Mark Zuckerberg Resolves to ‘Fix’ Facebook in 
2018, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
mark-zuckerberg-resolves-to-fix-facebook-in-2018-1515104645 (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
7 See generally Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of 
Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121 (2014) (discussing 
the incentives and implications of censorship on social media platforms and 
advocating for First Amendment protections); Trevor Puetz, Note, 
Facebook: The New Town Square, 44 SW. L. REV. 385 (2014) (arguing that 
Facebook should be treated as a public forum for First Amendment 
purposes, with Facebook’s censorship capacity limited by the quasi-
municipality doctrine). 
8 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104380170714571 
[https://perma.cc/3L94-MXCL]. 
9 Brett Molina, Facebook Admits Spending Too Much Time on Facebook 
Might Be Bad for You, USA TODAY (Dec. 18, 2017, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/12/18/facebook-
admits-spending-too-much-time-facebook-might-bad-you/960418001/ 
[https://perma.cc/3M46-KSAT]; David Ginsburg & Moira Burke, Hard 
Questions: Is Spending Time on Social Media Bad for Us?, FACEBOOK (Dec. 
15, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/hard-questions-is-
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Given that Facebook’s business model centers on maximizing 
the amount of time users view content—and, by extension, 
view advertisements10—Facebook has a clear conflict of 
interest with efforts to curb the negative effects of excessive 
screen time. While Facebook has taken steps to redesign its 
user experience away from passivity,11 the structure and 
incentives of the news feed (currently the main driver of 
native advertising on Facebook’s primary platform)12 reward 
Facebook’s current model.13 Furthermore, given studies 
linking teen depression to smartphone use,14  Facebook’s 
 
spending-time-on-social-media-bad-for-us/ [https://perma.cc/R6JC-W6CQ]; 
see also Holly B. Shakya & Nicholas A. Christakis, Association of Facebook 
Use with Compromised Well-Being: A Longitudinal Study, 185 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 203, 208 (2017) (finding that “the use of Facebook was 
negatively associated with overall well-being.”). 
10 See, e.g., David Ingram & Rishika Sadam, Facebook Shares Hit 
Record High as Mobile Ad Sales Soar, REUTERS (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-results/facebook-shares-hit-
record-high-as-mobile-ad-sales-soar-idUSKBN1AB2S8 
[https://perma.cc/98DW-JVU3] (“[Facebook] also is accelerating its push 
into video, an effort aimed at taking advertising dollars from the television 
industry and increasing the time people spend on Facebook.”). For an 
explanation of Facebook’s advertising business model, see infra Part III. 
11 Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, Inc., Remarks on Second Quarter 
2018 Results Conference Call (July 25, 2018), 
https://investor.fb.com/investor-events/event-details/2018/Facebook-Q2-
2018-Earnings/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/UZ83-A3HZ] (“We’ve 
launched multiple changes over the last half to news feed that encouraged 
more interaction and engagement between people and we plan to keep 
launching more like this.”). 
12 See Ingram & Sadam, supra note 10 (“Clearly, the biggest driver of 
growth is, overall, Facebook news feed.”). 
13 For an explanation of the news feed and its role in Facebook’s 
business model, see discussion infra Part III. 
14 One such study, from 2017, found a strong correlation between 
smartphone adoption and teen mental health problems. See Jean M. 
Twenge, Thomas E. Joiner, Megan L. Rogers & Gabrielle N. Martin, 
Increases in Depressive Symptoms, Suicide-Related Outcomes, and Suicide 
Rates Among U.S. Adolescents After 2010 and Links to Increased New Media 
Screen Time, 6 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 11–12 (2017) (“Since 2010, 
adolescents [have] spent more time on social media and electronic devices, 
activities positively correlated with depressive symptoms and suicide-
related outcomes. . . . Indicators of economic recession (high unemployment 
2018.3_OBEAR_FINAL  
No. 3:994] MOVE LAST AND TAKE THINGS 999 
reliance on its mobile platform for the vast majority of its 
advertising revenue15 provides an example of how the 
company’s public relations efforts may ultimately conflict with 
its bottom line. Perhaps no one can predict how Facebook will 
ultimately address these public concerns, but at least one 
thing is abundantly clear: across multiple fields, there are 
serious national conversations about the implications and 
consequences of Facebook’s size and power.  
Surprisingly, Facebook’s dominance has thus far received 
little scrutiny from the traditional champion against 
concentrations of power: antitrust law. Antitrust authorities 
have largely turned a blind eye toward Facebook, even as 
journalists and business commentators have increasingly 
recognized the company’s monopolistic potential and criticized 
its anticompetitive practices.16 This blindness reflects 
 
and negative Dow Jones Index change) were not positively correlated with 
depressive symptoms, suicide-related outcomes, or suicide deaths when 
matched by year (in contrast to smartphone adoption and social media use, 
which were positively correlated with mental health indicators when 
matched by year).”). 
15 David Wehner, CFO, Facebook, Inc., Remarks on Second Quarter 
2018 Results Conference Call (July 25, 2018), 
https://investor.fb.com/investor-events/event-details/2018/Facebook-Q2-
2018-Earnings/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/T47G-H9J8] (“Mobile ad 
revenue . . . represent[ed] approximately 91% of ad revenue for the second 
quarter of 2018.”). According to Needham and Co. analyst Laura Martin, 
Facebook’s suite of mobile apps “are the de facto mobile advertising 
monopol[y].” Ingram & Sadam, supra note 10. 
16 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook’s Willingness to Copy Rivals’ 
Apps Seen As Hurting Innovation, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-willingness-
to-copy-rivals-apps-seen-as-hurting-innovation/2017/08/10/ea7188ea-7df6-
11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html [https://perma.cc/7JN4-XN4E] (“‘The 
dominance of these companies is choking off the start-up world,’ Roger 
McNamee, an early investor in Google and Facebook and founder of the 
investment firm Elevation Partners, said of the two companies. ‘I helped 
create a monster, and I regret it.’”); Brian Feldman, Is Facebook a 
Monopoly? Just Ask Snapchat, NEW YORK MAG. (Apr. 14, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/04/is-facebook-a-monopoly-just-ask-
snapchat.html [https://perma.cc/Z6JP-HWUG] (“[W]hen it’s considered as a 
business strategy, employing Facebook’s sheer magnitude as leverage to box 
out competition, it sounds less like a dishonorable practice, and more like 
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antitrust’s broader difficulty in adapting to the challenges and 
problems arising from the explosion of the internet. When the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought the seminal Microsoft 
litigation in 1998,17 few people outside the technology 
industry understood the internet’s potential.18 And yet, that 
case reflects one of last significant antitrust monopolization 
 
an anti-competitive, monopolistic one.”); Greg Ip, The Antitrust Case 
Against Facebook, Google and Amazon, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-case-against-facebook-google-
amazon-and-apple-1516121561 (on file with the Columbia Business Law 
Review) (discussing Facebook’s market power and comparing its 
anticompetitive conduct to that of past targets of antitrust litigation, 
including Standard Oil Co. and AT&T); Kelleher, supra note 1 (“At this 
moment in time, it’s safe to say social networking is Facebook.”). 
17 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
18 In 1998, only forty-one percent of adults went online, and seventy-
nine percent of non-internet users said they worried “not very much” or “not 
at all” “about missing out on something by not going online.” Susannah Fox, 
The Internet Circa 1998, PEW RES. CTR. (June 21, 2007), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2007/06/21/the-internet-circa-1998/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DWQ-CKAL]. In contrast, Bill Gates’ 1995 “Internet 
Tidal Wave” memo—an important piece of evidence in the Microsoft 
litigation—assigned the internet the “highest level of importance,” and 
declared that the internet “will set the course of [the] industry for a long 
time to come.” Memorandum from Bill Gates to Executive Staff and Direct 
Reports (May 26, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/ 
legacy/2006/03/03/20.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGW9-2QXB]. 
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challenges19 and remains a leading doctrinal case for 
assessing monopolization claims.20 
There is a growing body of scholarship criticizing current 
antitrust doctrine’s failure to “capture the architecture of 
market power in the twenty-first century marketplace,” 
especially for tech companies and internet platform 
intermediaries.21 At the heart of the debate is a tension 
 
19 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure, 75 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 739, 739 (2009) (describing the Microsoft case as “unquestionably the 
most visible antitrust case since the breakup of AT&T”). Even with the DOJ 
and Federal Trade Commission’s recent focus on blocking mergers, tech 
companies have largely been given a pass. For example, the FTC approved 
the merger of Facebook and Instagram in 2012, despite widespread 
acknowledgement in the business community that Instagram was one of 
Facebook’s greatest potential competitors. See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, 
Instagram Was Facebook’s Biggest Threat, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2012, 1:33 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-was-facebooks-biggest-
threat-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/2U4Y-CLQR]; Facebook Buys Instagram for 
$1 Billion, Turns Budding Rival into Its Standalone Photo App, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Facebook Buys Instagram], 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/09/facebook-to-acquire-instagram-for-1-
billion/ [https://perma.cc/67U6-NDBM] (describing the deal as “squashing a 
threat to [Facebook’s] dominance in photo sharing.”). While the FTC did not 
disclose its reasons for approving the merger, the United Kingdom Office of 
Fair Trading (which also approved the merger) relied on the fact that 
Instagram did not have advertising or a revenue stream. See Josh Constine, 
Why the OFT and FTC Let Facebook Buy Instagram: FB Camera Is Tiny, 
IG Makes No Money, and Google, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2012), 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/08/22/ftc-facebook-instagram 
[https://perma.cc/K6H6-KRA6]. That reasoning seems naïve in hindsight, 
given that Instagram now runs ads generating more than ten percent of 
Facebook’s revenue and could be independently valued at $100 billion. See 
Emily McCormick, Instagram Is Estimated to Be Worth More than $100 
Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2018, 2:17 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-25/value-of-facebook-s-
instagram-estimated-to-top-100-billion (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). 
20 See, e.g., Benjamin M. Miller, Product Hopping: Monopolization or 
Innovation?, 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 89, 104 (2016) (citing Microsoft as 
the analytical framework for monopolistic conduct). 
21 Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 
716 (2017) (arguing that current antitrust doctrine fails to properly account 
for the underlying structure and market dynamics of modern economics). 
See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND 
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between proactive antitrust enforcement to protect 
competition and the possibility of condemning, for lack of 
understanding, conduct that is actually procompetitive and 
pro-consumer.22 Because the tech industry, in particular, 
experiences rapid shifts in business models and market 
power, antitrust law may react too slowly (allowing a firm to 
 
COMPETITION POLICY ch. 7 (2016) (arguing that antitrust merger review fails 
to take into account the competitive impacts of “big data” in tech industries); 
Pamela J. Harbour & Tara I. Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An 
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 773 
(2010) (arguing that the antitrust agencies should define “relevant product 
markets” for tech industries based on “current and future interrelationships 
and convergence among various technologies,” accounting for “areas where 
new and meaningful competition is likely to emerge” due to technological 
developments); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: 
Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015) (criticizing antitrust’s failure to 
address zero-price markets such as search engines and social media 
platforms); Timothy Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 
ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that antitrust agencies have 
struggled to give appropriate weight to attentional power in assessing the 
market power of advertising-based tech platform intermediaries). But see 
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: 
The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 
178 (2011) (arguing that aggressive enforcement of antitrust law against 
companies like Google could discount potential procompetitive justifications 
and create a “substantial risk for a false positive which would chill the 
innovation and competition that currently provides immense benefits to 
consumers.”); Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 1771, 1800–05 (2012) (deeming the current antitrust world 
“appropriate” and concluding that Facebook and similar firms should not be 
subject to monopolization liability, but also recognizing the potential for 
“firms with market power in the technology space. . . [to] engage in a variety 
of tactics to prevent the second wave of creative destruction” central to a 
Schumpeterian model of competition). 
22 This tension has been at the core of antitrust policy since the rise of 
the Chicago School in the 1980s. For a discussion of the Chicago School’s 
assumptions and impact on contemporary antitrust enforcement, see Khan, 
supra note 21, at 717–22. See also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58 (“Whether any 
particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of 
vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means of illicit 
exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad. The 
challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for 
distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and 
competitive acts, which increase it.”). 
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entrench itself as a monopolist and eliminate competitors 
before the antitrust authorities can recognize the 
anticompetitive nature of its conduct), or too quickly 
(improperly presuming that conduct that might have been 
anticompetitive in traditional markets will have the same 
effects in tech markets).  
Therefore, in addition to understanding the nature of 
market power and monopoly in the tech industry, it is 
important to understand what anticompetitive conduct looks 
like in the twenty-first century. So far, antitrust doctrine has 
largely failed to address this challenge. While “rigorous 
definition of market power” remains an important step before 
the identification of exclusionary and harmful behavior,23 
antitrust authorities need to embrace new conceptions and 
theories of anticompetitive harm. These can both guide their 
inquiry of market power and allow them to move quickly 
against monopolists when that power and harm are 
identified.24  
Facebook’s recent string of copycat conduct provides an 
ideal example of a kind of anticompetitive harm currently 
overlooked by antitrust law. Although copying has long been 
a mainstay in the tech industry,25 Facebook’s highly 
publicized copying of popular features of rival apps—both 
 
23 Waller, supra note 21, at 1803. 
24 The Microsoft court acknowledged the especial need for quick 
responses to anticompetitive behavior in the tech industry: “[J]ust over six 
years have passed since Microsoft engaged in the first conduct plaintiffs 
allege to be anticompetitive. As the record in this case indicates, six years 
seems like an eternity in the computer industry. By the time a court can 
assess liability, firms, products, and the marketplace are likely to have 
changed dramatically.” 253 F.3d at 49. 
25 See Dwoskin, supra note 16 (“Many in Silicon Valley say copying is 
fair game, arguing it is intrinsic to competition and to the history of U.S. 
business.”); Betsy Morris & Deepa Seetharaman, The New Copycats: How 
Facebook Squashes Competition From Startups, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017, 
1:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-copycats-how-facebook-
squashes-competition-from-startups-1502293444 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review) (“Facebook executives have said publicly it is 
common in tech for companies to build on technologies pioneered by 
others.”). 
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established, highly-capitalized rivals such as Snapchat,26 and, 
perhaps more importantly, fledgling startups—has shone a 
spotlight on a previously unrecognized array of 
anticompetitive harms.27 In recent years, Facebook’s copying 
has become so brazen and obvious that one journalist joked 
that the company’s new motto should be “Move Last and Take 
Things.”28 
This Note will map out Facebook’s copying campaign, 
tracing the sources of Facebook’s growth and documenting the 
company’s shift away from competitive market disruption 
towards anticompetitive market stagnation. In particular, the 
Note will analyze how specific aspects of the social media 
market enabled Facebook to build a legitimate empire 
through procompetitive copying, and describe how Facebook 
then corrupted those same strategies toward anticompetitive, 
exclusionary ends. In order to provide a coherent framework 
that identifies anticompetitive copying while avoiding 
condemnation of procompetitive behavior, this Note will 
propose a new exclusionary theory: predatory copying.   
Part II of this Note provides an overview of monopolization 
doctrine and existing exclusionary theories under section 2 of 
 
26 See Kathleen Chaykowski, Facebook’s Rich History of Copying 
Snapchat, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2016, 11:32 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2016/08/03/snapchat-
copycat-facebooks-rich-history-of-copying-its-best-features/#6ac1d0f73b79 
[https://perma.cc/UX9C-J66P] (documenting Facebook’s series of Snapchat-
cloning attempts). 
27 See Dwoskin, supra note 16 (“When venture capitalists hear pitches 
from entrepreneurs, they say that one of the first questions they ask is how 
easy would it be for Facebook to copy the idea.”); id. (describing Facebook’s 
“new reputation as a threat to start-ups” as a result of its copying); Morris 
& Seetharaman, supra note 25 (“Silicon Valley is dominated by a few titans, 
a development that’s fundamentally altering the nature of America’s 
startup culture. . . . The deep pockets of giants such as Facebook, Alphabet 
Inc.’s Google, Apple Inc. and Amazon.com Inc. make it increasingly difficult 
for startups to compete and stay independent. . . . Lately, the titans also 
appear to be imitating smaller rivals more aggressively.”). 
28 Josh Constine, Instagram Stories Hits 200m Users, Surpassing 
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the Sherman Act. Part III will then analyze Facebook’s social 
media business model, exploring how consumer-focused 
development and user-growth strategies interact with 
Facebook’s advertising incentives as a platform-intermediary. 
Part IV will document specific instances of Facebook’s current 
copycat campaign, explaining how Facebook responds to 
threats from both established rivals and nascent competitors. 
Finally, Part V will evaluate the exclusionary case against 
Facebook, exposing the inadequacies of current section 2 
exclusionary theories. It will then turn to predatory copying 
as a new approach to understanding and identifying the 
relevant anticompetitive harms.  
II. MONOPOLIZATION UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to 
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States.”29 In United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court established the 
current monopolization test. A successful monopolization 
claim requires proof of two elements: (1) “possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market,” and (2) “willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”30  
A. Monopoly Power and Attention Brokers 
The first element of the Grinnell monopolization test—
possession of monopoly power—poses a difficult challenge 
when applied to social media markets. As suggested above, 
most of the scholarship on social media markets has focused 
on the question of market power.31 Because direct proof of 
 
29 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
30 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
31 See supra note 21. 
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monopoly power is rarely available,32 one of the most effective 
ways to prove monopoly power is to show that a firm possesses 
a dominant share of a relevant market, which is protected by 
entry barriers.33 
In a typical monopolization case, then, the first step is 
often market definition. A product’s relevant market includes 
those “commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers 
for the same purposes.”34 Two products are in the same 
market if consumers view them as economic substitutes—
meaning that a rise in the price of one product would drive 
consumers to switch to the other, less expensive product.35 A 
narrow market definition will include fewer substitutes and 
 
32 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (per curiam). Direct proof of monopoly power is evidence that shows 
that a firm can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive 
level. Id. 
33 Id. The Microsoft court defined “entry barriers” as factors “that 
prevent new rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the 
competitive level.” Id. For a discussion of entry barriers in social media 
markets, see Waller, supra note 21, at 1786–93. Harbour & Koslov, supra 
note 21, at 777, have cited Facebook as a clear example of a tech firm that 
has created and exploited network effects, a kind of entry barrier created 
when the value of a network to a user increases in proportion to the number 
of other users. Although there is a growing consensus that advertising 
platform intermediaries, such as Google and Facebook, benefit from the 
network effects, Manne & Wright, supra note 21, at 208, have expressed 
skepticism towards the notion that network effects raise exclusionary 
concerns. They argue that network “feedback effects” are internalized by the 
dominant platform in the form of higher costs to advertisers; so, smaller 
platforms remain competitive to the extent that their advertising prices 
reflect their diminished reach. Id. The Microsoft court acknowledged this 
debate. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 (“[T]here is no consensus among 
commentators on the question of whether, and to what extent, current 
monopolization doctrine should be amended to account for competition in 
technologically dynamic markets characterized by network effects. . . . 
Indeed, there is some suggestion that the economic consequences of network 
effects and technological dynamism act to offset one another, thereby 
making it difficult to formulate categorical antitrust rules absent a 
particularized analysis of a given market.”). 
34 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 
(1956). 
35 For a basic introduction to substitutes and complements, see ARLEEN 
J. HOAG & JOHN H. HOAG, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMICS 65–66 (2006). 
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therefore will indicate that a firm has a higher market share 
than they would have under a broader definition. Thus, 
antitrust enforcement agencies and plaintiffs generally argue 
for narrower market definitions, and antitrust defendants 
generally argue for broader market definitions. The debate 
over the correct definition is often highly contentious, and 
sometimes dispositive.  
Defining product markets for internet platform 
intermediaries remains an unresolved problem in modern 
antitrust. Unlike traditional firms that sell their products to 
consumers, social media companies—and other advertising 
platform intermediaries such as Google—often offer their 
services to consumers for “free.”36 Instead of charging 
consumers, Facebook monetizes its product by selling ad 
space.37 Professor Timothy Wu coined the term “attention 
broker” to describe companies, including Facebook, that 
attract consumer attention and then resell that attention to 
advertisers.38 Unlike traditional platform intermediaries, 
which simply bring together buyers and sellers from two 
separate markets to facilitate transactions,39 attention 
brokers “sit[] at the juncture between two different types of 
 
36 Platform businesses often differ from traditional business models 
because optimal pricing for one side of the platform “may result in setting 
price on a particular market side below measures of average variable or 
marginal cost incurred by customers on that market side,” leading to 
platform businesses that “charge one side little or nothing.” David S. Evans, 
The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 
325, 328 (2003). Thus, Facebook does not charge individuals to create 
profiles. See Common Myths About Facebook, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/369078253152594 [https://perma.cc/SKF4-
G8QS] (“Facebook is a free site and will never require that [users] pay to 
continue using the site.”). However, individual Facebook users arguably do 
pay to use Facebook by transferring to Facebook the right to gather data, a 
valuable commodity. See, e.g., Jennifer Zhu Scott, You Should Be Paid for 
Your Facebook Data, QUARTZ (Apr. 11, 2018), https://qz.com/1247388/you-
should-be-paid-for-your-facebook-data/ [https://perma.cc/W2R2-ZYXL] 
(noting that “data ownership is not a privacy issue—it’s an economic issue”). 
37 See infra Part III. 
38 Wu, supra note 21. 
39 “Classic examples include credit card companies, shopping malls, or 
online firms like eBay” and Amazon. See id. at 18. 
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markets—a money market on the one side, and an attention 
market on the other.”40 
The unique structure of attention brokers poses a difficult 
choice for market definition: whether to focus on user markets 
or on advertising markets. Courts and antitrust enforcement 
agencies tend to focus on the advertising side of this equation, 
defining attention broker product markets based on the scope 
of the advertising market.41 Thus, instead of looking at 
whether individual consumers—in Facebook’s case, individual 
profile users—treat a product as a substitute, courts tend to 
evaluate whether advertisers would switch to a substitute in 
response to a price increase.42 So, if an advertiser switches its 
business to another attention broker B in response to a price 
increase by attention broker A, then A’s and B’s products are 
in the same advertising market.  
Under this model, Facebook is in the same product market 
as another attention broker if advertisers would respond to a 
small-but-significant price hike for ad space on Facebook by 
taking their advertisement business to the other broker.43 
Thus, even though Facebook’s market might, from an 
intuitive, individual user point of view, consist solely of other 
social media companies (including Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) 
from among which users choose to spend their “social media” 
time, Facebook’s advertising product market might be shared 
with a much broader range of attention brokers. Advertisers 
could conceivably respond to a Facebook price increase by 
shifting their advertisements not only to other social media 
companies, but also to search engines like Google, online 
 
40 Id. 
41 See Manne & Wright, supra note 21, at 220–23. 
42 For a critique of this method of market definition, see Wu, supra note 
21. 
43 The significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test, 
first implemented by the Justice Department for merger review, tests 
substitution by determining whether a hypothetical monopolist could profit 
from a price increase of five to ten percent for at least one year. Larger 
hypothetical price increases may result in overly broad market definitions. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4.1, (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/ENF5-8VDW]. 
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stores like Amazon, or even to non-internet-based attention 
brokers such as television networks or print newspapers.44 
While the debate over market definitions provides valuable 
context for the subsequent discussion of business models and 
exclusionary conduct, this Note will not delve further into the 
question of how to properly define product markets for social 
media companies.45 Therefore, in evaluating the merits of 
 
44 David Evans, in work done for Google, concluded that nearly 
everything on the web competing for attention is presumptively in the same 
market: “[A]ttention seekers compete with each other, at least to some 
degree, across even broadly defined products and service categories. When 
one attention seeker gets more attention some other attention seeker is 
probably getting less.” David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry Among Online 
Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis (Coase-Sandor Inst. 
for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 627, 2013). At least one district court 
has espoused a similar argument. See KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., 
No. C06-2057JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) 
(“[T]here is no logical basis for distinguishing the Search Ad Market from 
the larger market for Internet advertising. Because a website may choose 
to advertise via search-based advertising or by posting advertisements 
independently of any search, search-based advertising is reasonably 
interchangeable with other forms of Internet advertising. The Search Ad 
Market thus is too narrow to constitute a relevant market.”). 
45 As noted at the beginning of this Section, product market definitions 
are, in practice, heavily litigated and highly technical. For a fuller 
discussion of whether “online social media market” constitutes a cognizable 
product market, see generally Waller, supra note 21. Of particular 
relevance, Waller notes that Facebook benefits from a host of network 
effects and other barriers to entry that provide “further information 
regarding whether the market shares are an accurate indication of true 
market power.” Id. at 1786. See infra Part IV for a discussion of Facebook’s 
network effects and entry barriers. Although Waller speculated that 
Facebook might be replaced with another new platform as Facebook itself 
replaced Friendster and Myspace before it, see id. at 1801, Facebook’s 
continued and growing dominance since Waller’s article was published in 
2012 puts into question the Schumpeterian assumptions underlying that 
speculation. At the very least, Facebook’s now decade-long dominance of the 
social media landscape makes it unique among peers: Myspace ceded 
dominance to Facebook a mere five years after it was launched, and 
Friendster ceded dominance to Myspace after a mere two years. See infra 
Part III for a discussion of the history of Friendster, Myspace, and early 
social media markets. As Oliver Williamson noted in 1972, “persistent 
dominance of an industry by a single firm is not to be expected.” Oliver E. 
Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure 
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potential monopolization cases against Facebook, this Note 
assumes arguendo that Facebook possesses monopoly power 
in an online social media market. With this assumption 
established, the next Section will turn to an overview of the 
body of law most relevant to this project: Grinnell part two, or 
proof of “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”46 
B. Exclusionary Conduct 
In early monopolization cases under the Sherman Act, the 
DOJ47 enforced the antitrust laws with little guidance and a 
large degree of doctrinal flexibility—cases were driven as 
often by political motives as by concrete economics.48 
Throughout the twentieth century, the judiciary fleshed out 
the vague commandments of the Sherman Act into a complex 
and rich body of law. Along the way, the courts altered some 
of the basic assumptions underlying the earlier cases. These 
shifts generated an antitrust law that arguably targets a 
different subset of conduct and prioritizes a different set of 
values than Congress originally intended when it passed the 




Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1972). This Note contends that 
such persistent dominance should be even more vigorously scrutinized in 
technological markets, where the pace of innovation makes such time 
periods seem “like an eternity.” See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). 
46 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
47 The FTC was not established until the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41, nearly a quarter century after the Sherman Act. 
48 See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, 
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (“From 
the Sherman Act’s passage in 1890 through the passage of the Federal 
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts in 1914, antitrust was a ‘movement’ 
that inspired public agitation, not the specialized ‘enterprise’ that it later 
became.”). 
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1. Alcoa, Grinnell, and the Beginnings of 
Anticompetitive Conduct Analysis 
The first true guiding statement of modern monopolization 
law arrived over a half century after the Sherman Act, from 
the pen of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America (“Alcoa”).49 By the time that the DOJ brought 
its case against Alcoa in 1937, the aluminum manufacturer 
had been the subject of antitrust scrutiny for nearly three 
decades.  
Following the expiration of process patents in 1909, by 
virtue of which Alcoa had achieved a legal monopoly in 
aluminum production,50 Alcoa began engaging in a series of 
anticompetitive practices.51 A mere three years later, in 1912, 
the DOJ entered into a consent decree with Alcoa. This 
consent decree settled monopolization charges stemming from 
cartels Alcoa formed with foreign aluminum producers and 
their exclusive dealing arrangements with power suppliers. 
Alcoa undertook these activities to prevent other aluminum 
producers from attaining the large supplies of electricity 
necessary at the time for aluminum production.52 In 1924, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) again accused Alcoa of 
wrongful practices, alleging that Alcoa violated the 1912 
consent decree; the DOJ subsequently opened an 
investigation, which it closed in 1926.53 That close brush—but 
successful avoidance of liability—created a tide of 
controversy, with “[h]igh profile Senate hearings focused on 
the DOJ’s inaction and . . . the FTC’s stated inability to 
 
49 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 
1945). At the time, a panel of the Second Circuit’s senior judges was 
designated by special legislation as the court of last resort. Marc Winerman 
& William E. Kovacic, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant Application 
of the Sherman Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299–300 (2013). The Supreme 
Court approved of Alcoa one year later in Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). 
50 Winerman & Kovacic, supra note 49, at 298. 
51 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430 (“[I]n 1909, when its last lawful monopoly 
ended, it sought to strengthen its position by unlawful practices.”). 
52 Winerman & Kovacic, supra note 49, at 298. 
53 Id. 
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cooperate fully in the inquiry.”54 In 1937, the DOJ, then 
headed by future Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, took 
another shot at Alcoa. Following a two-year trial, the district 
court ruled for Alcoa.55 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Hand reversed the 
district court’s ruling and found Alcoa guilty of 
monopolization.56 Judge Hand established several core 
principles before evaluating Alcoa’s pertinent conduct. Most 
importantly, he explained that mere possession of monopoly 
power is not an antitrust offense:  
[T]he origin of a monopoly may be critical in 
determining its legality. . . . This notion has usually 
been expressed by saying that size does not determine 
guilt; that there must be some ‘exclusion’ of 
competitors; that the growth must be something else 
than ‘natural’ or ‘normal’; that there must be a 
‘wrongful intent,’ or some other specific intent; or that 
some ‘unduly’ coercive means must be used. . . . 
[P]ersons may unwittingly find themselves in 
possession of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that 
is, without having intended either to put an end to 
existing competition, or to prevent competition from 
arising when none had existed; they may become 
monopolists by force of accident. Since the Act makes 
‘monopolizing’ a crime, as well as a civil wrong, it 
would be not only unfair but presumably contrary to 
the intent of Congress, to include such instances. . . . 
The successful competitor, having been urged to 
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.57 
Judge Hand proceeded to dispel the notion that Alcoa was 
such a passive beneficiary of a monopoly, writing that Alcoa 
deliberately engaged in a course of conduct to “effectively 
anticipate[] and forestall[] all competition, and succeed[] in 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 299. 
56 The court remanded the case to the district court to craft an 
appropriate remedy. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 448. 
57 Id. at 429–30. 
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holding the field alone.”58 By opening up new production 
capacity in response to any increase in demand, Alcoa 
prevented potential competitors from entering the aluminum 
business. Alcoa argued that such conduct should be 
commended rather than condemned; it characterized its 
continued satiation of aluminum demand as “evidence of the 
skill, energy and initiative with which it has always conducted 
its business.”59 Judge Hand dismissed this defense, finding 
that Alcoa’s conduct was not driven by its business acumen, 
but rather by its desire to crush potential competitors before 
they could challenge its dominance:  
It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always 
anticipate increases in the demand for ingot and be 
prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep 
doubling and redoubling its capacity before others 
entered the field. It insists that it never excluded 
competitors; but we can think of no more effective 
exclusion than progressively to embrace each new 
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer 
with new capacity already geared into a great 
organization, having the advantage of experience, 
trade connections and the elite of personnel. Only in 
case we interpret ‘exclusion’ as limited to maneuvres 
not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire 
to prevent competition, can such a course, 
indefatigably pursued, be deemed not ‘exclusionary.’ 
So to limit it would in our judgment emasculate the 
Act; would permit just such consolidations as it was 
designed to prevent.60 
Thus, Judge Hand imposed a fairly limited exception to 
monopolization liability, available only to those “who do not 
seek, but cannot avoid, the control of a market.”61 This 
reasoning—in contrast to the modern paranoia with respect 
to accidentally condemning procompetitive, pro-consumer 
 
58 Id. at 430. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 431. 
61 Id. 
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behavior—seems borderline outlandish.62 With the advent of 
price theory63 and the availability of capital markets, modern 
antitrust doctrine generally presumes that new competitors 
will easily attract the investment necessary to enter 
monopolized markets in order to extract a piece of the 
monopoly rent.64 According to this logic, Alcoa’s own expanded 
production capacities alone could not possibly have excluded 
competitors. 
As such, Alcoa arguably blurred the line between 
anticompetitive conduct and otherwise legitimate business 
strategies.65 Although Alcoa would almost certainly come out 
differently today, the core principles espoused in Judge 
Hand’s opinion became enshrined in the antitrust canon. In 
Grinnell v. United States, the Supreme Court fashioned 
Hand’s overture on accidental monopoly into the second prong 
of a section 2 monopolization test, but expanded the liability 
defense beyond mere accident, stating the second prong as 
requiring “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
 
62 This disconnect is only further confounded by Judge Hand’s admitted 
reluctance to enforce the Sherman Act: “I despise this whole method of 
dealing with a very real and very serious problem in our industrial life; but 
this is the way we have chosen, and we ought not to wince, because of the 
vagueness of the outlines, when we are faced with so clear an instance.” 
Winerman & Kovacic, supra note 49, at 296 (citing Pre-Conference 
Memorandum from Judge Learned Hand to Judges Augustus N. Hand and 
Thomas W. Swan at 13–14 (Feb. 2, 1945) (on file in Learned Hand Papers, 
Harvard Law School Library, Box 207, Folder 17)). 
63 Price theory is a central tenet of the Chicago School. See Richard A. 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 
932 (1979). Price theory assumes that the market will allocate resources to 
“areas where they will earn the highest return.” Id. at 928. 
64 These economic ideas also predated the Chicago movement. See, e.g., 
MARC A. EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONS, 
EXPERTISE, AND POLICY CHANGE 105 (1991) (describing capital requirements 
as merely “objective technical demands of production and distribution,” and 
concluding that “all firms are subject to the threat of potential competition 
. . . regardless of the number of firms or levels of concentration”). 
65 See Winerman & Kovacic, supra note 49, at 302 (noting that “[t]o his 
critics, Hand embraced an utterly wrongheaded view of industrial 
organization, and he willingly engaged the antitrust system in a program 
that destroyed efficiency in pursuit of hazy egalitarian objectives”). 
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power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”66 After Grinnell, business savvy was once 
again a defense to monopolization.67 
2. The Microsoft Revolution: Antitrust, 
Technology, and Exclusionary Conduct 
In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,68 the D.C. Circuit 
revisited and revised the antitrust canon established by Alcoa. 
Microsoft was engaged in a broad system of conduct aimed at 
preserving its monopoly in the operating system market 
against competitive threats from Netscape (a rival internet 
browser company), middleware, and Java.69 The district court 
held Microsoft liable for four types of exclusionary conduct: (1) 
integrating Internet Explorer (Microsoft’s own internet 
browser) into Windows (its operating system) to exclude other 
internet browsers; (2) creating exclusive dealing and licensing 
arrangements; (3) intentionally subverting Java technologies; 
and (4) its overall course of conduct.70  
Like Judge Hand in Alcoa, the Microsoft court established 
a set of principles defining the contours of exclusionary 
conduct before turning to the specific behavior at issue. But 
while Judge Hand was quick to dismiss Alcoa’s pro-consumer 
argument, Microsoft embedded a broad procompetitive 
defense at the center of its monopolization analysis:  
 
66 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) 
(emphasis added). 
67 The Supreme Court has since hesitated to condemn monopolies 
established via business acumen, observing that “[t]he opportunity to 
charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (dictum). 
68 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). 
69 Id. at 47, 58. Technically, the court defined the relevant market as 
Intel-compatible PC operating systems, a narrower market definition. Id. at 
46, 50–54. 
70 Id. at 58. 
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[I]f a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie 
case under § 2 by demonstrating anticompetitive 
effect, then the monopolist may proffer a 
“procompetitive justification” for its conduct. If the 
monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification—a 
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form 
of competition on the merits because it involves, for 
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer 
appeal—then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
rebut that claim.71 
If the plaintiff fails to rebut the procompetitive 
justification, then the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove 
that the conduct’s anticompetitive harms outweigh any 
procompetitive benefits.72 Thus, where a legitimate 
procompetitive justification conflicts with a legitimate 
anticompetitive theory of harm, the Microsoft court relied on 
a balancing test to determine whether to impose liability for 
the underlying conduct.73 
The Microsoft court also clarified and narrowed the concept 
of anticompetitive effects, writing that “to be condemned as 
exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must . . . harm the 
competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, 
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”74 Thus, it 
was not enough for the plaintiffs to show that Microsoft’s 
conduct harmed its emerging competitor, Netscape. Rather, 
the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that Microsoft’s 
conduct was of the kind “which unfairly tends to destroy 
competition itself.”75 
Turning to the alleged exclusionary conduct, the court 
proceeded to apply this new framework to each category of 
harmful behavior. The Microsoft court engaged in a lengthy, 
highly detailed, and technical evaluation of the 
 
71 Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
72 Id. The Microsoft court compared this analysis to the “rule of reason” 
approach used in horizontal agreement cases under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. Id. 
73 Id. (describing the rule of reason as a “balancing approach”). 
74 Id. at 58. 
75 Id. 
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procompetitive and anticompetitive arguments within each 
category.76 For example, when considering Microsoft’s 
technological integration of Internet Explorer (“IE”) and 
Windows, the court found that the government had met its 
burden of showing that Microsoft’s conduct deterred original 
equipment manufacturers (“OEM”)—the companies that 
manufacture computers and other hardware—from pre-
installing and supporting other browsers.77 However, the 
court expressed hesitation towards condemning these 
activities because they represented product design choices.78 
The court recognized that questioning product design choices 
carries a greater risk of condemning pro-consumer 
innovation.79 However, noting that “[j]udicial deference to 
product innovation . . . does not mean that a monopolist’s 
product design decisions are per se lawful,” the court 
concluded that Microsoft’s choices “reduce[d] the usage share 
of rival browsers not by making Microsoft’s own browser more 
attractive to consumers, but, rather, by discouraging OEMs 
from distributing rival products.”80 With the exception of the 
default browser override, the court found that “Microsoft 
failed to meet its burden of showing that its conduct serves a 
purpose other than protecting its operating system 
 
76 See id. at 59–80. 
77 Specifically at issue were Microsoft’s choices to (1) remove IE from 
the “Add/Remove Programs” utility, preventing users from uninstalling the 
program, (2) in certain circumstances, override the user’s choice of a default 
browser other than IE, and (3) commingle IE’s code with other files such 
that any attempt to delete IE would cripple the operating system. Id. at 65. 
78 Id. (“As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about 
claims that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product 
design changes.”). 
79 Id. (“In a competitive market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of 
appealing to consumers, sometimes in the process making their products 
incompatible with those of rivals; the imposition of liability when a 
monopolist does the same thing will inevitably deter a certain amount of 
innovation. This is all the more true in a market, such as this one, in which 
the product itself is rapidly changing.”). 
80 Id. 
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monopoly.”81 For this and every other category of alleged 
harm, the court carefully scrutinized the evidence in the 
record supporting each of Microsoft’s procompetitive 
justifications.82 
Microsoft provides examples of several modern theories of 
anticompetitive conduct, but the case also provides something 
more important: context and comparison. The Microsoft 
court’s thorough examination of the specific anticompetitive 
effects, potential procompetitive benefits, and the balance 
between those factors for each and every theory of harm, 
stands in stark contrast to Judge Hand’s comparatively 
summary conclusion of anticompetitive harms in Alcoa. 
Microsoft demonstrates that modern monopolization 
enforcement, especially against tech companies, is a 
demanding and evidence-intensive endeavor.  
3. Predatory Pricing and the Limits of the 
Monopolization Offense 
In addition to the general exclusionary theories present in 
Microsoft,83 antitrust law also has developed a set of specific 
 
81 Id. at 67. The court credited Microsoft’s claims that it had “valid 
technical reasons” for overriding user browser choices in certain 
circumstances, noting that plaintiffs had failed to rebut the justification or 
show that it was outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. Id. 
82 See, e.g., id. at 63–64 (concluding that Microsoft failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to show that licensing restrictions to OEMs were 
necessary to maintain platform stability and consistency and to prevent 
user confusion); id. at 67–71 (considering and rejecting Microsoft’s 
argument that exclusive dealing arrangements with internet service 
providers were procompetitive because they allowed developers to focus on 
one browser); id. at 74–78 (analyzing Microsoft’s efforts to sabotage the 
fledgling Java industry, and notably reversing liability for Microsoft’s 
development of its own Java platform that was incompatible with the most 
popular Java provider because Microsoft’s platform allowed users to run 
Java applications faster on Windows). 
83 In Microsoft, much of the court’s analysis focused on exclusive 
dealing, but it also leaned upon general exclusionary principles, recognizing 
that “the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, 
are myriad.” Id. at 58. The Microsoft court also examined a product tying 
theory based on Microsoft integrating IE into Windows, id. at 84–97, and 
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theories of anticompetitive behavior. These theories establish 
specific standards, elements, or burdens that help to narrow 
and clarify the antitrust inquiry. Examples of such theories 
include exclusive dealing, refusal to deal, product tying, and 
bundling and loyalty discounts.84 Although fully surveying 
these theories is beyond the scope of this Note, this Subsection 
will briefly summarize the current doctrine of one theory of 
exclusionary conduct: predatory pricing. Predatory pricing 
provides a useful example of an exclusionary theory that 
evolved in response to modern antitrust law’s concern with 
price theory and the “consumer welfare” principle.85 
Predatory pricing refers to the exclusionary strategy 
whereby a predatory firm prices its products below-cost in an 
effort to drive competitors out of business.86 After clearing the 
field of competition, the predatory firm then resumes 
 
also briefly touched on predatory pricing, but the plaintiffs did not press the 
theory on appeal, id. at 68. 
84 This list is not exhaustive, but covers some of the more popular 
theories. 
85 The “consumer welfare” principle asserts that antitrust law should 
focus solely on whether anticompetitive behavior decreases economic 
efficiency and raises prices for consumers. See Khan, supra note 21, at 720. 
In 1978, Robert Bork argued that Congress designed the Sherman Act to 
protect consumer welfare. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A 
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 56–61, 66 (1978); see also Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26 
(1966) (“Congress’ position with respect to efficiency cannot be explained on 
any hypothesis other than that consumer welfare was in all cases the 
controlling value under the Sherman Act.”). In 1979, the Supreme Court 
adopted Bork’s revisionist history of the Sherman Act. See Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing Bork for the proposition 
that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare 
prescription’”). Many modern antitrust scholars have criticized Bork’s 
“consumer welfare” analysis of the Sherman Act’s legislative history. See, 
e.g., Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 
2275 (2013) (“The legislative intent of the Sherman Act does not support 
Bork’s consumer welfare thesis.”). 
86 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (describing the essence of a predatory pricing claim as 
when “[a] business rival has priced its products in an unfair manner with 
an object to eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise 
control over prices in the relevant market.”).  
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monopoly pricing in order to recoup the losses from the 
predatory period. Although predatory pricing cases were 
commonplace in early antitrust enforcement,87 the Supreme 
Court has since established a restrictive predatory pricing 
doctrine.88 
In Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.,89 the Supreme Court established a special recoupment 
test for predatory pricing: plaintiffs “must demonstrate that 
there is a likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would 
cause a rise in prices above a competitive level that would be 
sufficient to compensate for the amounts expended on the 
predation, including the time value of the money invested in 
it.”90 Thus, to satisfy the recoupment test, plaintiffs must 
prove: (1) that the defendant was pricing “below cost”; and (2) 
that the defendant had a reasonable prospect of recoupment. 
The recoupment test expressed the Chicago School concern 
that false positives in predatory cases would significantly chill 
legitimate competition, because the “mechanism by which a 
firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the 
same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition[.]”91 
In practice, though, a reasonable prospect of recoupment is 
exceedingly difficult to show. In United States v. AMR Corp.,92 
the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the “below cost” prong of the 
 
87 The earliest predatory pricing case was Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), where Standard Oil charged monopoly 
profits in geographic areas where it had no competitors to fund predatory 
pricing schemes in competitive markets. See Khan, supra note 21, at 723. 
In response to the Standard Oil case, Congress created a supplementary 
statutory scheme, including the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 52–53 (2012), and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21 (2012), 
that successfully encouraged active antitrust enforcement against 
predatory pricing. Khan, supra note 21, at 723–25. 
88 See Khan, supra note 21, at 727–30. The Court adopted the Chicago 
School reasoning that below-cost pricing is irrational, and hence rarely 
occurs, because the entry of subsequent competitors makes recoupment 
unlikely. Id. at 726–28. 
89 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
90 Id. at 225. 
91 Id. at 226. 
92 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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recoupment test focused exclusively on the allegedly 
predatory firm’s average variable costs (AVC)93—the average 
of costs that vary with the level of output. Because AVC does 
not account for the full marginal cost of the allegedly 
predatorily-priced goods,94 plaintiffs often have difficulty 
satisfying the first recoupment prong. The Tenth Circuit 
credited the Chicago School’s influence in establishing “a 
consensus among commentators that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”95 
As a result, the recoupment requirement has caused a 
substantial drop in the number of successful predatory pricing 
cases.96 
Brooke Group and AMR Corp. reflect the continued 
influence of price theory and the Chicago School in modern 
antitrust law. Other exclusionary theories have evolved 
similarly permissive schemes in the name of avoiding over-
enforcement and chilling procompetitive behavior.97 Having 
established the general contours of the section 2 
monopolization offense and its current cautious approach for 
 
93 Id. at 1120. The court elaborated that it did not intend to “favor AVC 
to the exclusion of other proxies for marginal cost,” id. at 1116, but 
nonetheless rejected all of the government’s alternatives and held that the 
government had failed to establish below-cost pricing because it was 
“uncontested that American did not price below AVC.” Id. at 1120. 
94 Because AVC only accounts for costs that vary with the level of 
output, it discounts fixed costs such as “management expenses, interest on 
bonded debt, property taxes, depreciation, and other irreducible overhead . 
. . .” Id. at 1115. 
95 Id. at 1114 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)). 
96 Khan, supra note 21, at 730 (citing D. Daniel Sokol, The 
Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, 
and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1013 (2014)). For a critique of 
current predatory pricing doctrine, see generally id. 
97 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (severely restricting the exclusive dealing 
doctrine and limiting the then-controlling precedent, Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985) (condemning 
exclusive dealing that sacrifices “short-run benefits and consumer goodwill 
in exchange for a perceived long-run impact” to exclude smaller rivals)). 
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avoiding false positives, this Note will now return to the 
discussion of Facebook and the social media business model. 
III. THE BALANCING ACT: FACEBOOK’S SOCIAL 
MEDIA BUSINESS MODEL 
Understanding the kinds of anticompetitive harms that 
might arise in the social media market requires 
understanding the market’s business structures and 
incentives. As the reasoning in Microsoft suggests, a course of 
conduct that excludes competitors in one market may actually 
be procompetitive in another.98 Different markets will have 
different barriers to entry, and a monopolist may try to exploit 
the barriers native to their market in order to effectively 
exclude competitors. As advertising platform intermediaries, 
Facebook and other social media platforms operate between 
the attention market for consumers and the traditional 
market for advertisers. Thus, it is valuable to consider what 
sorts of incentives arise from each of these markets, and how 
Facebook has responded to those incentives in the past. 
Examining Facebook’s behavior before it obtained market 
dominance yields insights into how its current behavior might 
exclude competitors.  
A. User-Focused Development 
Although online social media has existed in some form 
since the beginning of the internet,99 it took decades for the 
 
98 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (“Whether any particular act of a monopolist is 
exclusionary, rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be 
difficult to discern: the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of 
legitimate competition, are myriad. The challenge for an antitrust court lies 
in stating a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which 
reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it.”). 
99 Or, arguably, even before the internet. See Saqib Shah, The History 
of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ 
[http://perma.cc/E5H2-CUTZ] (“[C]omputer networking was initially 
envisioned in the heyday of The Beatles as a military-centric command and 
control scheme. But as it expanded beyond just a privileged few hubs and 
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business model to evolve into its current form. While Facebook 
has dominated the social media world since the late 2000s, it 
was by no means the first social media revolutionary. As in 
many industries, Facebook built its empire on the backs of 
giants. While the first true precursor to today’s social media 
networks emerged under the America Online umbrella in the 
1990s, social networking found its first popular success in 
2003’s Friendster.100 
Although Friendster was not the first website to introduce 
individual member profiles, it found success in an interface 
that allowed users to share traits and connect with other users 
through a “degree of separation concept.”101 Within three 
months, Friendster attracted over three million users,102 
prompting Google to offer to purchase Friendster for $30 
million later in 2003.103 But within a year, Friendster was in 
decline: the website suffered from technical difficulties and 
questionable management,104 and CEO Jeff Winner resigned 
at the end of 2004.105 Most importantly, though, 2003 proved 
a fateful year for the social media industry generally.106 
Friendster now had to compete with a “new crop of copycat 
 
nodes, so too did the idea that connected computers might also make a great 
forum for discussing mutual topics of interest, and perhaps even meeting or 
renewing acquaintances with other humans. In the 1970s, that process 
began in earnest.”). 
100 Id. The company made its Web debut in March 2003. Gary Rivlin, 
Wallflower at the Web Party, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/business/yourmoney/15friend.html?_r
=1 [https://perma.cc/2MWM-YUCE]. 
101 Shah, supra note 99. This structure also made Friendster popular 
as an early online dating platform. See id. 
102 Devon Glenn, The History of Social Media from 1978–2012 
[Infographic], ADWEEK (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.adweek.com/digital/the-
history-of-social-media-from-1978-2012-infographic/ 
[http://perma.cc/EQH6-M5UP]. 
103 Rivlin, supra note 100. At the behest of optimistic investors, 
Friendster founder Jonathan Abrams rejected Google’s offer. Id. 
104 Shah, supra note 99. 
105 Rivlin, supra note 100. 
106 Shah, supra note 99. 
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sites” and other market entrants, including Myspace and 
LinkedIn.107 
Despite its copycat label, Myspace built and innovated 
upon Friendster’s concept. Myspace added features like blogs 
and tools that allowed users to “jazz up their profiles,” which 
Friendster, with its technological issues, could not compete 
with.108 Myspace “tempt[ed] the key young adult demographic 
with music, music videos, and a funky, feature-filled 
environment. It looked and felt hipper than major competitor 
Friendster right from the start.”109 “At Myspace, they rode the 
wave instead of fighting it, and encouraged users to do pretty 
much as they pleased.”110 By 2006, Myspace had over fifty 
times more monthly domestic visitors than Friendster111—it 
sat upon the social networking throne. 
Myspace’s rapid dominance of the social media scene 
attracted the attention of Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation, which purchased the site in 2005 for $580 
million. 112 However, while Friendster had opened the door for 
Myspace’s rise by popularizing social media among 
consumers, Myspace still faced a substantial challenge: 
monetization. Although Myspace attracted a large user base, 
those users were simply not interested in clicking ads.113 
 
107 Note that as early as 2006, the copycat label was being applied to 
insurgents in the social media market. Rivlin, supra note 100. Additionally, 
while Myspace originally used the spelling MySpace, it changed its name 
and adopted the lowercase “s” in 2010. Jennifer Pointer, Newsflash: The 
Social Network Formerly Known as “MySpace” is now “Myspace,” 
WEBREVELATION (Nov. 2, 2010), https://www.webrevelation.com/newsflash-
the-social-network-formerly-known-as-myspace-is-now-myspace 
[http://perma.cc/76BN-V6LV]. 
108 See id. 
109 Shah, supra note 99. 
110 Rivlin, supra note 100. 
111 Id. 
112 Lori Kozlowski, New Life: How MySpace Spawned a Start-Up 
Ecosystem, FORBES (May 15, 2012, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
lorikozlowski/2012/05/15/how-myspace-spawned-a-startup-ecosystem/ 
#3b48894340ba [http://perma.cc/4X52-PRVK]. 
113 Kelleher, supra note 1. 
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In a twist of fate, Myspace’s early success paved the path 
for Facebook’s rise to dominance. After it was purchased by 
News Corporation, Myspace focused on growing its business 
and generating revenue.114 Meanwhile, Facebook was crafting 
a website tailored to maximize user-experience.115 In 
comparison to the clutter and chaos of individualized Myspace 
profiles and banner ads, Facebook “opted for a cleaner, 
Google-like interface that resonated with a broader 
audience.”116 But where Facebook curbed customizability, it 
embraced the functions most desired by users.117 Facebook 
declined to adopt any one business model, allowing it to react 
quickly to trends in how users were using the platform.118 
This was the era of “Move Fast and Break Things.”119 At the 
end of the day, this approach allowed Facebook to create a 
better product for its users. Mike Jones, the former head of 
Myspace, recalled that “the world had been trained by 
Myspace that social networking was interesting, but the 
actual product had been perfected by Facebook.”120 
 
114 See Yinka Adegoke, Special Report: How News Corp Got Lost in 
Myspace, REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2011, 11:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-myspace/special-report-how-news-corp-got-lost-in-myspace-
idUSTRE7364G420110407?sp=true [https://perma.cc/8H3K-NLGM] 
(“Zuckerberg’s great strength . . . was that he and his team were focused on 
product development and innovation while Myspace had become too 
concerned with revenue and meeting traffic targets[.]”); Adam Hartung, 
How Facebook Beat MySpace, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:36 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamhartung/2011/01/14/why-facebook-beat-
myspace/#3a6acbe3147e [http://perma.cc/4H32-5LMT]. 
115 See Hartung, supra note 114. 
116 See Kelleher, supra note 1. 
117 See Hartung, supra note 114. 
118 Id. Hartung describes Facebook’s strategy as “White Space 
management,” writing that “[Facebook’s] founders kept pushing the 
technology to do anything users wanted. If you have an idea for networking 
on something, Facebook pushed its tech folks to make it happen.” Id. 
Kelleher, supra note 1, similarly notes that, in contrast to Myspace, 
“Facebook bided its time, rather than rushing to a clear business model.” 
119 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
120 Harrison Jacobs, Former MySpace CEO Explains Why Facebook 
Was Able to Dominate Social Media Despite Coming Second, BUS. INSIDER 
(May 9, 2015, 6:13 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/former-myspace-
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As Facebook expanded, it continued to integrate features 
that were popular with users—even if the users did not know 
it at the time. In 2006, for example, Facebook launched the 
news feed feature, which allowed users to view new content in 
a centralized format, rather than having to visit individual 
friends’ profiles.121 While the news feed is now widely 
considered to be the core of Facebook’s main platform,122 the 
initial user reaction was mixed, if not hostile.123 Mark 
Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder, released a blog post following 
the launch of the news feed entitled “Calm Down. Breathe. We 
hear you.” to address public outcry.124 Zuckerberg’s post 
explicitly addressed one of the main user complaints: that the 
news feed was “overwhelming and cluttered.”125  
The user backlash to the news feed launch reflects the 
same anti-clutter user preferences that helped Facebook 
topple Myspace. But where Myspace was constrained by its 
centralized business structure,126 Facebook continued to 




121 Mathew Ingram, How Facebook’s Most Hated Feature Became the 
Future of the Company, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/facebook-news-feed-anniversary/?xid= 
soc_socialflow_facebook_FORTUNE [http://perma.cc/4KNS-JNDN]. There 
is conflicting history on whether the news feed was a true Facebook 
innovation, or whether the idea was launched in response to similar 
functionalities on Twitter and other competitors. See Bobbie Johnson, 
Facebook Patents the ‘News Feed’ - But Was It Really First?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
26, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/feb/26/facebook-
patent [http://perma.cc/DZ92-346C] (noting that competitors such as 
Twitter and Flickr had activity streams that pre-dated Facebook’s news 
feed). 
122 See Ingram, supra note 121. 
123 See Samantha Murphy, The Evolution of Facebook News Feed, 
MASHABLE (Mar. 12, 2013), https://mashable.com/2013/03/12/facebook-
news-feed-evolution/#tw2xXqINNPqp [http://perma.cc/4PHD-XM5X]. 
124 Calm Down. Breathe. We Hear You., FACEBOOK (Sept. 6, 2006, 1:45 
AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/calm-down-breath-we-hear-
you/2208197130/?_tn_=H-R [https://perma.cc/2NDX-5Y6H].  
125 Id. 
126 See Hartung, supra note 114. 
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popular Facebook features that was initially developed by 
outsiders before being integrated into the main platform.127 
When a feature or application proved popular—such as with 
photos,128 and later news feed129—Facebook kept them 
around. When the apps or features intruded too much on 
Facebook’s core platform they were either dropped or moved 
onto separate platforms. In 2014, for example, Facebook 
pulled its Messenger feature from the Facebook mobile app 
and forced users to download a second application if they 
wanted to use Messenger on their phones.130  
The separation of the Messenger app from Facebook’s main 
mobile app provides an example of the core tension of 
Facebook’s social media business strategy: consolidation 
versus specialization. When Facebook first released 
Messenger the goal was consolidation.131 Facebook noticed 
that online communication was spread over a variety of 
mediums—including text, email, and social media 
platforms—and saw the opportunity to centralize that 
communication on Facebook.132 As one journalist noted upon 
the launch of Messenger, “Facebook has a problem with how 
we communicate. Namely, that it’s through too many different 
 
127 See Michael V. Copeland, Facebook is Going Places. Where Will 




129 See Murphy, supra note 123. 
130 Steven Tweedie, Mark Zuckerberg Reveals Why You Were Forced to 
Download Facebook’s Separate Messenger App, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2014, 
9:58 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-is-facebook-messenger-a-
separate-app-2014-11 [http://perma.cc/SVH5-FYST]. Zuckerberg’s concern 
for protecting Facebook’s mobile app, even at the expense of Messenger, may 
have arisen from the dominance of Facebook’s mobile revenue streams over 
those from its traditional webpage. In 2017, Facebook’s mobile ad revenue 
accounted for up to eighty-seven percent of the company’s total advertising 
revenue, with the greatest driver of growth coming from news feed 
advertising. See Ingram & Sadam, supra note 10. 
131 See Scott Olster, Facebook’s Messaging: Rise of the IM Generation, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 16, 2010), http://fortune.com/2010/11/16/facebooks-
messaging-rise-of-the-im-generation/ [http://perma.cc/Q96X-8CEX]. 
132 See id. 
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media. . . . Facebook’s solution is to consolidate the whole 
thing. Which of course means that they’ll control it, too. It 
wants all of your messages to be fed through the same place—
Facebook.”133 But four years later, that consolidation proved 
too much. Zuckerberg attributed the divorce of Messenger 
from Facebook’s mobile app to the need for a streamlined user-
experience: “Messaging is becoming increasingly important. 
On mobile, each app can only focus on doing one thing well, 
we think.”134 In other words, over-consolidation was 
degrading user experiences. Facebook’s gamble in launching 
Messenger as a separate app paid off, and today Messenger 
has more than 1.3 billion monthly users, making it the most 
popular SMS replacement in the Western world.135 
Not all of Facebook’s experiments were as successful as 
Messenger. For example, in December 2012, Facebook 
launched Poke, an app for sending photo and video messages 
that would disappear within ten seconds.136 Poke did not gain 
much user traction, and Facebook pulled the app in 2014.137 
In June 2014, Facebook launched Slingshot, an app that 
required users to send a photo to a friend in order to view that 
friend’s own photo message—the app was pulled in December 
2015.138 Facebook did not leave underused features to collect 
dust, because that dust could contaminate the app’s more 
popular features.  
In 2018, Facebook reaffirmed its primary value to 
consumers: interconnectivity. As part of a “New Year’s 
Resolution” to “Fix Facebook,”139 Zuckerberg announced 
changes to the news feed designed to “show[] more posts from 
friends and family” and less from “public content, including 
 
133 Id. 
134 See Tweedie, supra note 130. 
135 Josh Constine, Facebook Messenger Day Hits 70M Daily Users as the 
App Reaches 1.3B Monthlies, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/14/facebook-messenger-1-3-billion/ 
[http://perma.cc/3V3Q-QHDM]. 
136 Chaykowski, supra note 26. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Seetharaman, supra note 6. 
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videos and other posts from publishers or businesses.”140 The 
changes were designed to encourage users to use the website 
more actively—as opposed to passively scrolling through the 
news feed—by prioritizing posts that generate higher user 
interaction (as measured by likes, comments, and shares).141 
Of course, Facebook is a business, and while Zuckerberg 
framed his announcement in terms of social responsibility,142 
the changes are also consistent with Facebook’s strategy for 
monetizing its users’ attention through ad revenue. In order 
to understand Facebook’s strategy, it will be helpful to 
understand how Facebook monetized its product in the first 
place. 
B. Monetizing Attention: How Facebook 
Revolutionized Social Media Advertising 
Myspace and Friendster may have popularized online 
social media, but Facebook made it a viable business model.143 
As an attention broker, Facebook relies on attracting large 
numbers of users by providing them with free content.144 
Facebook then sells advertising space that it presents 
alongside the free content.145 However, when Facebook first 
entered the social media market, this model had a 
fundamental problem: consumers did not click on 
advertisements.146 
 
140 Jonah E. Bromwich & Matthew Haag, Facebook Is Changing. What 




142 See generally Deepa Seetharaman, Lukas I. Alpert & Benjamin 
Mullin, Facebook to Overhaul How It Presents News in Feed, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 11, 2018, 11:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-considers-
prioritizing-trustworthy-news-sources-in-feed-1515714244 (on file with the 
Columbia Business Law Review). 
143 See Kelleher, supra note 1. 
144 See discussion, supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
145 See discussion, supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
146 See Kelleher, supra note 1. 
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Myspace’s click-through rates—defined as the percentage 
of times that people click on an ad147—“were 4 in 10,000 
[0.04%]—a fifth of the rate for banner ads on web sites in 
general.”148 Myspace’s problem was that “the only information 
anyone seemed to want on Myspace was what their friends 
were up to.”149 Myspace’s response to the low click rate was to 
put “multiple banner ads on pages, making the poorly 
designed pages even more unbearably cluttered.”150 Thus, 
Myspace’s attempt to monetize its users’ attention only 
exacerbated the clutter and chaos, accelerating its eventual 
defeat by Facebook’s cleaner design.151  
Facebook solved the click-through problem by employing a 
similar strategy to the one it used to develop its consumer 
content: experimentation. One of Facebook’s key innovations 
was to “reach out to the smallest advertisers with self-serve 
ads on its social-network site.”152 Facebook provided these 
small advertisers with basic tutorials, and then provided 
performance data to allow the advertisers to tweak their ads 
in response to what worked.153 Facebook also provided 
advertisers with a startling amount of customizability in 
selecting their target demographic—today, advertisers can 
select up to ninety-eight personal data points based on 
information such as location, age, generation, gender, 
 
147 Nathan Mendenhall, 2017 Facebook Advertising Benchmarks, 
SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/ 
marketing/2017-facebook-advertising-benchmarks [https://perma.cc/5Z3K-
V5N4]. 
148 Kelleher, supra note 1. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 Kevin Kelleher, How Facebook Fixed the Social Advertising 
Problem, FORTUNE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://fortune.com/2010/11/22/how-
facebook-fixed-the-social-advertising-problem/ [https://perma.cc/9MH4-
V246]. 
153 Id.; see also Capturing Attention in Feed: The Science Behind 
Effective Video Creation, FACEBOOK (Apr. 20, 2016), 
https://www.facebook.com/iq/articles/capturing-attention-feed-video-
creative [https://perma.cc/R9FJ-JNY4] (providing mobile advertisers advice 
on how to optimize advertisements for Facebook’s mobile app). 
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language, education level, field of study, ethnic affinity, 
income and net worth, and even the square footage of a user’s 
home.154 This service to advertisers is mutually beneficial: 
although Facebook provides the advertising metrics for free, 
advertisers’ experiments provide “unprecedented insight into 
what makes people click ads on [Facebook’s] site.”155 
Thanks to this arrangement, Facebook has gained a 
unique understanding of what kinds of advertising are 
effective on social media.156 Although Facebook does not 
release information about its average click-through rate, a 
2017 study of 256 U.S.-based Facebook advertising campaigns 
found an average click-through rate of 0.90%,157 or ninety out 
of 10,000—a 2250% increase over Myspace’s click-through 
rate. With a feedback loop between information and ad 
performance, Facebook also gains the benefit of a substantial 
network effect: as more advertisers work with Facebook, more 
information gets fed into the system. With more information 
behind each ad choice, advertisers get the benefit of being able 
to target a demographic with more and more precision, and 
they have greater confidence that they know exactly how well 
the ad will perform.  
With Facebook’s growth and expansion into the mobile app 
ad market, this network effect only grew stronger. Today, 
Facebook generates more than eighty-seven percent of its 
total ad revenue from mobile advertising.158 One analyst 
referred to Facebook’s suite of mobile apps as “the de facto 
mobile advertising monopolies.”159 Part of this success is due 
to Facebook’s ability to integrate advertising into the mobile 
app’s news feed content, which has allowed it to continue to 
 
154 See Caitlin Dewey, 98 Personal Data Points that Facebook Uses to 




155 Kelleher, supra note 152. 
156 Id. 
157 Mendenhall, supra note 147. 
158 Ingram & Sadam, supra note 10. 
159 Id. 
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increase the feed’s ad load without alienating consumers.160 
In contrast to Myspace’s cluttering banner ads, Facebook’s 
news feed ads blend into the rest of the site’s content. This 
strategy works, in part, thanks to the unique relationship 
between Facebook users and advertisers: “they become 
friends.”161 According to Kelleher, “Facebook has found that 
people are much more likely to click on a company’s page if it 
appears to be endorsed by their friends.”162 Facebook 
routinely uses “Likes” to “promote ‘Related Posts’ in the news 
feeds of the user’s friends . . . [T]he users themselves have 
possibly never seen the story, liked the story or even know 
that it is being promoted in their name.”163 With more users 
comes more likes, which Facebook can then use for more 
integrated advertisements to fuel its click-through revenue.  
These strategies built Facebook into an extraordinarily 
profitable company. In 2008, one year before Facebook 
overtook Myspace in unique monthly visitors,164 Facebook 
had $272 million in revenue and a negative cash flow of $56 
 
160 News feed ads are a form of “native advertising,” which “aims to 
eliminate obstruction to the user experience in a mobile app[] through its 
seamless integration with the app content.” ELENI MAROULI & JACK KENT, 
IHS TECH, THE FUTURE OF MOBILE ADVERTISING IS NATIVE 4 (2016), 
https://scontent-lga3-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.2365-6/12427056_89768251 
7015706_590297266_n.pdf?_nc_cat=111&oh=a15c7f6b2edbf96bcdca7828b9
6b7529&oe=5C5ADAF2 [https://perma.cc/E6V9-TE3R]. “Ads that feel 
organic to the experience are more likely to get noticed and less likely to 
annoy [] visitors.” Maximize Your Revenue with Native Ads, FACEBOOK 
AUDIENCE NETWORK, https://www.facebook.com/audiencenetwork/ 
products/native [https://perma.cc/94Y5-MW5K]. 
161 See Kelleher, supra note 152. 
162 Id. 
163 See Anthony W. Kosner, Facebook Is Recycling Your Likes to 
Promote Stories You’ve Never Seen to All Your Friends, FORBES (Jan. 21, 
2013, 8:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2013/01/21/ 
facebook-is-recycling-your-likes-to-promote-stories-youve-never-seen-to-
all-your-friends/#541947d917aa [https://perma.cc/36VB-UNSS]. 
164 See Chloe Albanesius, More Americans Go to Facebook than 
MySpace, PCMAG (June 16, 2009), 
https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2348822,00.asp 
[https://perma.cc/E66B-A9C7]. In May 2008, Facebook had less than half as 
many unique monthly visitors as Myspace. Id. 
2018.3_OBEAR_FINAL  
No. 3:994] MOVE LAST AND TAKE THINGS 1033 
million.165 A year later, it had tripled revenues to $777 
million, and posted its first profit of $229 million.166 Facebook 
has continued its meteoric rise: in 2017, the company reported 
$40.7 billion in revenue, and $15.9 billion in profit.167 
IV. FACEBOOK’S COPYCAT CAMPAIGN 
Facebook established its dominance among social media 
users due to two elements of its business strategy: (1) rapid 
innovation in response to consumer analytics and usage 
trends, and (2) a focus on streamlining user experiences and 
purging excess clutter. In recent years, however, Facebook’s 
monopolization of the social media market has flipped both 
basic tenets on their heads. While Facebook was rarely an 
independent innovator, preferring instead to refine and 
integrate applications and features in a symbiotic relationship 
with developers,168 today Facebook wields its market power to 
prevent disruptive innovations and to entrap both developers 
and consumers, potentially at the expense of Facebook’s user 
experience.  
 





168 Facebook was not the first social media platform to introduce now 
central features such as a “like” button, a real-time news feed, an activity 
feed, or live video streaming capability. See Alex Hern, Facebook Live Is 
Changing the World—But Not in the Way It Hoped, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/05/facebook-live-social-
media-live-streaming [https://perma.cc/P5RB-XBFK] (describing how 
Facebook’s live-stream feature followed the success of other livestreaming 
apps such as Meerkat and Twitter-subsidiary Periscope); Johnson, supra 
note 121 (suggesting that Facebook’s news feed built off of the activity feeds 
pioneered by competitors such as Twitter and Flickr); Corrinne Litchfield, 
The Rise and Fall of FriendFeed, the Social Network That Brought You the 
‘Like’ Button, KERNEL (May 15, 2016), http://kernelmag.dailydot.com/issue-
sections/features-issue-sections/16642/friendfeed-history-glue-together-
web/ [https://perma.cc/29US-VSGC] (describing how startup FriendFeed 
pioneered both the “like” button and real-time news feed before being 
acquired by Facebook in 2009). 
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A. Identifying Entry Barriers 
Facebook’s main strategy to exclude competitors centers on 
exploiting the entry barriers to social media markets. 
Although certainly not a necessary element of exclusionary 
conduct, exploiting such entry barriers is one effective way for 
monopolists to exclude competitors. These barriers provide a 
natural amplifier for exclusionary pressure. In Microsoft, for 
example, the court condemned Microsoft for exploiting the 
applications entry barrier, which locked in both consumers 
and developers as a kind of network effect.169 Developers were 
more likely to create applications for an operating system that 
already had a large number of users, and users were more 
likely to choose an operating system that had a large selection 
of available applications. Much of Microsoft’s conduct at issue 
in that case, including undermining Java and limiting the 
distribution of middleware browsers, was aimed at 
eliminating alternative channels of application 
distribution.170 
Facebook’s social media business model suggests that 
Facebook benefits from a set of interconnected network effects 
that pose a substantial entry barrier to potential competitors. 
First, as many commentators have argued,171 the social media 
 
169 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (“[T]he ‘applications barrier to entry’ . . . stems from 
two characteristics of the software market: (1) most consumers prefer 
operating systems for which a large number of applications have already 
been written; and (2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems 
that already have a substantial consumer base.”); id. at 56 (“Because the 
applications barrier to entry protects a dominant operating system 
irrespective of quality, it gives Microsoft power to stave off even superior 
new rivals.”). The court did not explicitly refer to this “chicken and egg” 
problem as a network effect, but the underlying logic is the same: “the utility 
that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with the number 
of other agents consuming the good.” Id. at 49. 
170 See id. at 75–78. 
171 See, e.g., Harbour & Koslov, supra note 21, 776–77 (“Success in the 
Web 2.0 world relies on the creation and exploitation of network effects. . . . 
One current example is the tremendous growth in the number of Facebook 
users.”); Waller, supra note 21, at 1788 (“Facebook benefits from a host of 
both direct and indirect network effects. The sheer number of users in the 
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market has substantial network effects that lock in users. 
This means that as more consumers use Facebook, individual 
consumers are less likely to leave Facebook for a competitor’s 
service because their connections—what makes social media 
valuable for consumers—are on Facebook, not the 
competitor’s service. To break the network effect, a challenger 
would have to be able to quickly capture an individual 
consumer’s network. 
Second, the social media market has similar network 
effects that lock in advertisers. The more advertisers that use 
Facebook, the more accurate Facebook’s on-site advertising 
effectiveness becomes. While Facebook might still compete 
with other advertisers such as Google, Facebook users’ 
willingness to share vast amounts of personal data—by filling 
in the data on their profile, checking in at a Place, clicking 
“Like” on a company’s page, or using any of the myriad other 
features from which Facebook collects user information—
allows Facebook advertisers to tailor their advertisements to 
increasingly specific demographics, enabling more precise and 
effective advertisements with higher click-through rates.172 A 
nascent competitor for advertising may find it difficult to 
compete with the flexibility and effectiveness provided by 
Facebook’s ad network, which is only likely to grow stronger 
with time.173  
 
system is the most obvious such effect and makes its network immensely 
more valuable than any of its competitors.”); Chris Butts, Note, The 
Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading “New Economy” 
Firms, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 290 (2010) (“In the social 
networking space, the network effect manifests itself in a similar way to the 
operating system space in that the more users of the platform there are, the 
higher the switching costs, the greater the network externalities, and the 
more benefit to using the platform for users.”). 
172 See Travis Holland, How Facebook and Google Changed the 
Advertising Game, CONVERSATION (Mar. 12, 2017, 3:19 PM), 
http://theconversation.com/how-facebook-and-google-changed-the-
advertising-game-70050 [https://perma.cc/FUZ2-3GNY]. 
173 Id. (“With Facebook and Google dominating, many other web 
publishers are at a loss as to what to do. They find it difficult to find the 
‘right solution to the big question of driving payment for quality content.’”). 
Holland attributes Facebook’s success to its ability to provide marketers 
with precisely targeted ads using its users’ personal data. Id. 
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Third, the social media market has a network effect for 
applications, which also facilitates Facebook’s efforts to 
perfect the balance between consolidation and specialization. 
As noted above, Facebook’s early strategy involved rapid 
experimentation with a variety of apps and features; the 
successful apps were integrated into the platform, while the 
less-successful apps were abandoned.174 This history of app 
and feature development gives current application developers 
a base of knowledge with which to tailor their applications to 
Facebook’s user experience. In addition to designing 
applications that will be compatible with Facebook in order to 
take advantage of Facebook’s larger user base, application 
developers can also draw on the lessons imparted by the 
successes and failures of past applications.175 In comparison, 
a nascent competitor trying to attract app developers can only 
offer a blank slate, with few points of reference on which kinds 
of applications and features will resonate with its user base.  
Furthermore, consumers benefit from Facebook’s 
developed expertise in balancing available apps versus 
specialization and a streamlined user experience; they have 
access to a broad number of applications, without the burden 
of too many unnecessary applications that would clutter the 
platform. In comparison, a nascent competitor would have to 
try to strike this balance between consolidation and 
specialization from scratch; they might try to offer too many 
applications, which might drive away overwhelmed users in a 
reminiscent of Myspace’s decline, or offer too few, and thus 
hurt themselves with both consumers and with application 
developers, who will be less incentivized to pour resources into 
development.176  
 
174 See supra notes 115–138 and accompanying text. 
175 Facebook reported that “roughly 100 million apps and businesses 
use Facebook’s developer tools or have a Facebook page that drives 
installations to apps.” Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
176 Even established, experienced competitors face an uphill battle 
when they try to retool their platforms in order to avoid direct competition 
with Facebook. For example, journalist David Pierce describes Snapchat 
users’ hostility towards Snapchat’s 2017 overhaul—which he attributes as 
a reaction to Instagram’s copying campaign—as “a hatred that burned with 
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As a result of these interlocking grids of network effects, 
Facebook enjoys dominance in a market surrounded by many 
barriers to entry. This suggests that Facebook has a monopoly 
in the social media market.177  
B. Copying Competitors Out of Existence 
Recently, Facebook has come under increasing criticism for 
blatantly copying the apps and features of competitors.178 
While copying is neither new nor secret in the social media 
world, Facebook’s recent conduct nonetheless represents a 
departure from the status quo. Facebook has blatantly copied 
rival apps and features since its founding, but over time its 
motivation for copying has shifted away from embracing new 
pro-consumer innovations and towards stamping out 
competitors. Facebook, as an entrenched monopolist, occupies 
 
the fury of a thousand suns.” David Pierce, The New Snapchat: Less Social, 
More Fun, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2018, 10:25 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-snapchat-less-social-more-fun-
1519143235?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2 (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review). 
177 See Waller, supra note 21, at 1786 (“[H]igh entry barriers confirm 
that the market shares are a meaningful indication of power and may even 
understate the ability of the firm in question to harm competition and 
consumers.”). 
178 See, e.g., Chaykowski, supra note 26 (documenting a series of 
“Snapchat-cloning attempts” by Facebook); Dwoskin, supra note 16 
(describing Facebook’s “aggressive strategy” to “mimic the most successful 
features of rival companies’ apps,” including businesses for an “online 
fundraising tool, food delivery, offline meetups, and its ‘On This Day’ 
feature”); Feldman, supra note 16 (“Facebook is completely unafraid of 
leveraging its enormous social graph to make use of its competitor’s 
innovations and choke those competitors out.”); Morris & Seetharaman, 
supra note 25 (“Zuckerberg told employees they shouldn’t let pride get in 
the way of serving users, another way of saying they shouldn’t be afraid to 
copy rivals. . . . The message became an informal internal slogan: ‘Don’t be 
too proud to copy.’”); Kurt Wagner, Facebook Copied Snapchat a Fourth 
Time, and Now All Its Apps Look the Same, RECODE (Mar. 28, 2017, 8:00 
AM), https://www.recode.net/2017/3/28/15079774/facebook-stories-
snapchat-instagram-copy [https://perma.cc/EQA4-SUVM] (“Facebook has 
shown that it likes to stick with what works—and what works is copying 
competitors.”). 
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a unique position that allows it to copy apps and features with 
little regard for how those features might conflict with its core 
platform functionality and user experience. 
Much of Facebook’s early copying left space for the copied 
service to continue competing. For example, in 2010 Facebook 
launched Places, which some commentators noted looked 
suspiciously similar to Foursquare,179 a location check-in app 
founded in 2009.180 However, Places left sufficient room for 
Foursquare to operate, with Facebook effectively inviting 
Foursquare to integrate into Facebook’s platform.181 
Zuckerberg announced Places by stressing that Facebook was 
offering something “substantially different from other 
services out there,” with the implication that Foursquare and 
other location-based apps could “continue to keep their users 
happy while more tightly integrating with Facebook.”182 In 
fact, Facebook offered an application programming interface 
to allow Foursquare to layer its service on top of Places.183 
Today, Foursquare remains in operation, although it 
redesigned and removed its core “check-in” feature.184 
This sort of “benevolent copycatting”—a term this Note 
will use to describe such symbiotic relationships—may have 
some benefits for the copied rival. When Foursquare 
integrated with Facebook, it arguably gained better access to 
 
179 See Copeland, supra note 127; Kelleher, supra note 1 (“All this 
follows the unveiling of Places, a check-in feature that looks an awful lot 
like Foursquare.”). 
180 See Jennifer Van Grove, Foursquare Goes Global with Launch in 50 
New Cities, MASHABLE (Nov. 19, 2009), https://mashable.com/2009 
/11/19/foursquare-50-more-cities/#2HtXxZV7NqqC [https://perma.cc/5EFC-
RUW9]. 
181 See Copeland, supra note 127. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Ashley Feinberg, Foursquare 8.0: A Lot More Yelp-Like, a Lot 
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Facebook’s then more than 500 million users.185 Similar 
integrations, including that by the casual gaming company 
Zynga helped the integrated company drive new business on 
top of Facebook’s core platform.186 However, it is important to 
note that such benevolent copycatting does not necessarily 
benefit everyone: Scott Stern, a management professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes that app 
developers realize they might be better off being acquired 
instead of competing, and therefore have an incentive to 
design their apps with that goal in mind.187 Such acquisitions 
“can be ‘a very good win for the founders, [but] might be at the 
expense of a more competitive landscape.’”188 When app 
developers create their products with Facebook integration in 
mind, they lose the incentive to create any product that will 
not integrate well with the platform; this further reinforces 
Facebook’s dominance in applications, securing its market 
power from competitors.189 Thus, benevolent copycatting can 
still create an entry barrier that helps maintain Facebook’s 
monopoly in the social media market.   
Other developers, especially those in direct competition 
with Facebook, have not fared as well as Foursquare or Zynga. 
When Facebook cannot acquire or integrate a rival company, 
its copying evolves into an aggressive strategy to poach the 
rival’s potential users and prevent defections from their own 
 
185 Copeland, supra note 127 (noting that Foursquare, Yelp, and other 
companies affected by the Places launch had “already integrated their 
services with Facebook”). 
186 Id. 
187 See Morris & Seetharaman, supra note 25. 
188 Id. 
189 This logic appears in the Microsoft decision, where the court 
condemned Microsoft’s exclusive dealing provisions with application 
developers. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 71–73 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (per curiam). As part of these agreements, developers agreed 
to use Internet Explorer as their default browsing software for their 
applications. Id. at 71. The court endorsed the district court’s finding that 
by locking in the developers, Microsoft’s deals “increase the likelihood that 
the millions of consumers using applications designed by [independent 
software vendors] that entered into agreements with Microsoft will use 
Internet Explorer rather than Navigator.” Id. at 72. 
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user base.190 This strategy came to the fore when Google 
launched its own social media platform, Google+, in June 
2011.191 Zuckerberg and Facebook started a “war” to “crush” 
the potential competitor.192 Arguably, Google+ was itself a 
copy of Facebook,193 and a better-executed one at that: 
Google+ had a “cleaner and more minimalist” design than 
Facebook, no ads, and superior photo-sharing capabilities.194 
This combination of features mirrored the capabilities which 
allowed Facebook to displace Myspace as the dominant social 
 
190 To conceptualize how this kind of copycatting prevents user 
defections, imagine a political election in which an established politician 
fends off a new rival by copying the ideas in the rival’s platform that give 
them unique appeal among voters. If the established politician adopts some 
form of these ideas into their platform, then voters might be less likely to 
invest the time and resources necessary to research the rival—sticking to 
the familiar, established politician requires no such investment. While this 
might seem like a success in the free exchange of ideas (as the voter 
preferences are now also reflected in the established candidate), it also 
leaves the possibility that the established candidate might be less effective 
at implementing the new idea than the rival, or that the established 
candidate might merely be paying lip service to the rival’s ideas. Similarly, 
Facebook may not need to re-create a rival’s feature as well as the rival in 
order to secure the gains from copying them. And Facebook could provide 
lip service to its users, copying the rival’s feature long enough to starve the 
competitor out of the market, and then removing the feature once the rival 
is no longer a threat—this strategy is similar to the predatory pricing theory 
of harm described in Part II, especially if Facebook believes that the new 
feature does not actually improve their platform or otherwise does not 
integrate effectively with their business strategy. Compare such lip service 
to an established politician who copies a rival’s pledge to increase funding 
for schools, but then fails to follow through or later pulls that funding 
because it conflicts with their prioritized goal of lowering taxes—by the time 
the voters catch on, the election is already over. 
191 Vic Gundotra, Introducing the Google+ Project: Real-Life Sharing, 
Rethought for the Web, GOOGLE: OFFICIAL BLOG (June 28, 2011), 
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/introducing-google-project-real-
life.html [https://perma.cc/BBD5-9W5E]. 
192 Antonio García Martínez, How Mark Zuckerberg Led Facebook’s 
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media platform. Furthermore, Google+ was integrated with 
other Google products like Gmail and YouTube; former 
Facebook product manager Antonio Martínez compared 
Google’s strategy to Microsoft’s exploitation of its Windows 
monopoly to crush Netscape.195 According to Martínez, 
Google+ “hit Facebook like a bomb. [Zuckerberg] took it as an 
existential threat comparable to the Soviets’ placing nukes in 
Cuba in 1962.”196 
While Facebook responded to Google+ in part by doubling 
down on quality control,197 Facebook also copied parts of 
Google+’s design. In March 2013, Facebook launched its first 
ever major update to News Feed.198 The new design was 
cleaner, more organized, and put more emphasis on pictures—
almost immediately, people began commenting on the 
similarities to Google+.199 By April 2014, the Google-Facebook 
war had mostly run its course.200 Martínez attributed 
Facebook’s victory to its strong user network: “Once everyone 
and his mother was on Facebook, they weren’t leaving it, even 
when the internet’s most used site (i.e., Google Search itself) 
was used as inducement to join.”201 In 2018, Google 
announced plans to shut down Google+, concluding that “the 
work required to maintain [the platform] was not worth the 
effort, considering the meager use of the product.”202  
 
195 Id. According to Martínez, Google could leverage its search 
monopoly to “bankroll taking over social media as well.” Id. Recall that 
Microsoft leveraged its Windows operating system monopoly to promote its 
internet browser, Internet Explorer, over Netscape. See supra notes 68–70, 
76–81 and accompanying text.  
196 Id. 
197 See id. 
198 Murphy, supra note 123. 
199 See Samantha Murphy, Is Facebook the New Google+?, MASHABLE 
(Mar. 7, 2013), https://mashable.com/2013/03/07/facebook-google-
plus/#WIDrl3wkNsqB [https://perma.cc/7Y2E-M5NF]. 
200 See Martínez, supra note 192.   
201 Id.  
202 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Plus Will Be Shut Down After User 
Information Was Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/technology/google-plus-security-
disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/Q3XD-HCZM]. Notably, Google shut down 
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While the Google-Facebook war may be over, the trauma 
of the conflict and the lessons from Facebook’s victory 
continue to shape Facebook’s strategy for staying ahead of the 
competition. Since its war with Google+, Facebook has 
developed strategies and acquired sophisticated technology 
with the goal of anticipating and excluding new competition. 
Former Facebook executives and employees report that 
Zuckerberg remains “sensitive to anything that might disrupt 
Facebook, even the teeniest startup.”203 In October 2013, 
Facebook purchased Onavo, a mobile data analytics 
company.204 Facebook has used Onavo’s technology to create 
an internal database to track rivals, including young startups 
performing unusually well.205 The tool gives Facebook “an 
unusually detailed look at what users collectively do on their 
phones.”206 Onavo can track how consumers use their phones, 
even when they are not using Facebook products, allowing 
Facebook to see how consumers are reacting to new features 
on other apps and platforms.207  
 
Google+ in response to a data security breach that “exposed the private data 
of up to 500,000 users.” Id. Facebook, which struggled with a similar data 
breach scandal in 2018 when a private organization, Cambridge Analytica, 
“improperly gained access to the personal information of up to 87 million 
Facebook users,” remains in operation. Id.  
203 Morris & Seetharaman, supra note 25. 
204 See Ingrid Lunden, Facebook Buys Mobile Analytics Company 
Onavo, Reportedly for Up to $200M… And (Finally?)  Gets Its Office in 
Israel, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 13, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2013/10/13/facebook-buys-mobile-analytics-company-onavo-and-finally-
gets-its-office-in-israel/ [https://perma.cc/N2WB-TRFG]. 
205 Morris & Seetharaman, supra note 25. 
206 Id. 
207 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. “[C]ritics say that Facebook isn’t clear 
enough about its affiliation with Onavo, implying that users might never 
know that the company uses the data from the app [to monitor rivals.]” 
Rachel Sandler, People Are Furious About Onavo, a Facebook-Owned VPN 
App That Sends Your App Usage Habits Back to Facebook, BUS. INSIDER 
(Feb. 14, 2018, 7:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-
facebooks-onavo-protect-virtual-private-network-app-2018-2 
[https://perma.cc/XJR5-MD6Z] (further noting that Facebook prompts users 
to download Onavo under the pretense of protecting their accounts). 
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Facebook uses Onavo’s data to quickly mimic the most 
successful features of rival companies’ apps. Most 
prominently, Facebook took this approach in response to its 
longtime rival Snapchat.208 In August 2016, after many 
attempts to copy Snapchat’s features,209 Facebook released a 
new feature, Stories,210 on its Instagram app.211 
Commentators immediately labeled Stories as a Snapchat 
clone.212 A few months later, in March 2017, Facebook 
launched Stories on Facebook itself, on both its mobile and 
website platforms.213 By April 2017, Instagram Stories 
surpassed 200 million daily users—nearly forty million more 
than Snapchat.214 Stories accumulated more daily active 
users in eight months than Snapchat had in three and a half 
years.215 As of August 2017, Snapchat’s user growth slowed 
by eighty-two percent,216 and the company posted over $443 
 
208 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
209 See Chaykowski, supra note 26, for a list of earlier Snapchat-
copying attempts. 
210 Id. 
211 Facebook acquired Instagram, a rival photo sharing app, in 2012. 
See Facebook Buys Instagram, supra note 19. Professor Wu argues that this 
acquisition showed a clear failing by antitrust authorities to recognize the 
anticompetitive potential of mergers between attention brokers. Wu, supra 
note 21. 
212 See, e.g., Chaykowski, supra note 26 (“There’s no denying 
Instagram’s new ephemeral “Stories” copies many aspects of Snapchat. 
From its name to the format . . . it’s reasonable to call Instagram’s feature 
a Snapchat clone.”); Dwoskin, supra note 16 (describing Facebook’s 
“aggressive strategy” to “mimic the most successful features of rival 
companies’ apps,” including key elements of Snapchat); Feldman, supra 
note 16 (“The disappearing-video format . . . was invented and pioneered by 
Snapchat, before being shamelessly ripped off by Instagram.”). 
213 See Wagner, supra note 178. 
214 See Feldman, supra note 16. 
215 See Constine, supra note 28. 
216 JuJu Kim, Best of the Week: Snapchat is Losing the Fight Against 
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million in quarterly losses217—presumably due in part to 
advertisers prioritizing resources toward developing ads for 
Instagram.218 
Zuckerberg’s preoccupation with fledgling competitors also 
reversed the trend of benevolent copycatting and integration. 
Silicon Valley correspondent Elizabeth Dwoskin notes that 
Facebook, with Onavo information in hand to help identify 
popular features, has reversed course and started to limit 
third party developers’ use of the Facebook platform and 
instead build those same features internally.219 With the 
ability to track consumer preferences, Facebook no longer has 
any incentive to outsource app development; it can allow new 
competitors to experiment, and then swoop in with its own 
version of the app. This practice gives Facebook a “new 
reputation as a threat to start-ups,” in contrast to past history 
“when a wave of start-ups, from dating and food-delivery apps 
to political consultancies, were able to grow by targeting their 
customers’ friends—and friends of friends—on Facebook.”220  
Facebook’s copycatting of new companies may cause 
significant anticompetitive harms, leading to decreased 
investment in startups and decreased innovation.221 
According to interviews with over a dozen top investors, 
including Sequoia Capital and Union Square Ventures, 
“[w]hen venture capitalists hear pitches from entrepreneurs, 
they say that one of the first questions they ask is how easy 
would it be for Facebook to copy the idea. It is increasingly the 
reason they decline to invest.”222 Although the executives of 
some smaller competitors, such as Meetup.com executive 
Scott Heiferman, see Facebook’s copycatting as a positive sign 
 
217 Seth Fiegerman, Snapchat’s Losses Soar, User Numbers Not So 
Much, CNN BUS. (Aug. 10, 2017, 6:05 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/10/technology/business/snapchat-
earnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/W79C-FXPB]. 
218 See Kim, supra note 216. 
219 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
220 Id. 
221 See supra note 27. 
222 See supra note 27.
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that their business is on to something,223 investors are less 
optimistic. Scott Sandell, managing partner of the venture 
capital firm New Enterprise Associates and former product 
manager for Microsoft, said of the copycatting phenomenon: 
“We don’t touch anything that comes too close to 
Facebook[.]”224  
Startups are not the only ones harmed by Facebook’s 
copycatting. If Facebook’s conduct makes it harder for new 
startups to fund their ideas, then consumers are deprived of 
the innovations that such companies might otherwise bring 
into the market. Furthermore, Facebook’s conduct might also 
cause harm to Facebook’s products. Not only does insulation 
from competition decrease Facebook’s incentive to 
innovate,225 but copycatting may also degrade the user 
experience by insulating Facebook from the need to balance 
consolidation with specialization. In other words, Facebook’s 
apps are becoming bloated.226 In an article exploring 
Facebook’s copycatting of Snapchat, journalist Brian Feldman 
noted that Facebook had adopted a “kitchen-sink approach[,] 
introducing to its app as many features and doodads as 
possible” in a way that made the app “almost unusably 
overstuffed.”227 Facebook has further resorted to inserting the 
same features into multiple apps, a practice that homogenizes 
the apps to the detriment of consumers.228 For example, by 
the time that Facebook integrated Stories into its main 
 
223 Dwoskin, supra note 16. Heiferman commented that “whenever you 
figure something out, if you crack the code on that, then Facebook comes 
along and copies it. . . . There’s certainly fire under our feet to go faster and 
bolder, and I guess you could say that’s the good thing about competition.” 
Id. Ben Rubin, the founder of Houseparty—one of the recent targets of 
Facebook’s copycatting—similarly said that he had “no problem with the 
copying,” describing it as “just business” and a “distraction,” even as 
Houseparty’s board pressured him to consider selling the company to 
Facebook. Morris & Seetharaman, supra note 25. 
224 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
225 See supra note 178. 
226 See Wagner, supra note 178. 
227 Feldman, supra note 16. 
228 See Wagner, supra note 178 (characterizing this kind of copying as 
an “unabashed defense strategy”). 
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platform in 2017, the feature was already present on three 
other apps in Facebook’s suite: Instagram, Messenger, and 
WhatsApp.229 This undermines the unique identities of 
Facebook’s apps, depriving consumers of variety and choice. 
The days when Facebook took care to avoid overwhelming 
consumers with too many apps and features230 appear over. 
Facebook can afford to overstuff its apps because of a 
combination of network affects and its own copycat conduct. 
Feldman argues that, 
[F]or all of Facebook’s problems, it knows that people 
won’t leave it, since that would also mean cutting off 
a primary means of contact with their social circles. 
What that ultimately means is that Facebook’s 
dominant size and expansive social graph will block 
out any competitors, simply by mimicking the most 
attractive new features.231  
In addition to harming consumers, Facebook’s conduct may 
be against its own interests—at least if its goal is to create 
better products, rather than simply exclude competitors. 
When Facebook promotes a feature in order to poach 
consumers from their competitors, such as Facebook’s 
promotion of Stories, that promotion choice often comes at the 
cost of advertising space.232 In order to effectively foreclose a 
competitor, it will often not be enough for Facebook simply to 
make a copied app or feature available. Instead, Facebook 
 
229 Id. 
230 See supra notes 115–138 and accompanying text. 
231 Feldman, supra note 16. 
232 Christian Fuchs correctly describes the space of a user’s screen that 
is filled with ads as a commodity that Facebook sells to advertisers. See 
CHRISTIAN FUCHS, CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 163 
(2015). If Facebook chooses to fill more of the user’s screen with new 
features, this either cuts into ad space, or cuts into existing user content. 
For example, when Facebook integrated Stories into the top row of its 
mobile app, see Joe Svetlik, Facebook Stories: What Is It and How Does It 
Work?, BT (July 27, 2018, 11:51 AM), https://home.bt.com/tech-
gadgets/internet/social-media/facebook-stories-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-
work-11364169985164 [https://perma.cc/9R7B-RRJX], Stories took up space 
previously dedicated to the news feed (which, as previously noted, is where 
Facebook places many of its ads). See Ingram & Sadam, supra note 10. 
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may sometimes have to make the new app or feature 
prominent enough such that its users begin to use the 
Facebook version before they are exposed to the 
competition.233 
But, as noted above, social media consumers are sensitive 
to over-cluttering and ad-ridden products;234 so, social media 
companies must strike a careful balance between content and 
advertising, or they risk alienating consumers. New features 
like Stories take up valuable screen space, reducing the space 
that Facebook could otherwise allocate for advertising. New 
features could alternatively displace other forms of content 
that has already proven popular with users; the sacrifice is 
the same, as users would see less of the content they already 
prefer in proportion to the constant level of advertising. In 
either case, Facebook can rely on its network effects and entry 
barriers to insulate itself from losing users.  
The laundry list of copycatting described above generates 
anticompetitive harms that should be proscribed by the 
antitrust laws. The final Part of this Note evaluates current 
antitrust doctrine’s ability to cognize copying as a form of 
exclusionary conduct and to address its resultant harms.  
V. FACEBOOK AND PREDATORY COPYING 
By copying popular features and applications, Facebook 
harms consumers, competitors, advertisers, and competition 
itself. As with most forms of monopolistic behavior, consumers 
will tend to bear the greater part of the cumulative harms. 
Facebook potentially harms consumers in a number of ways: 
(1) product degradation, as Facebook fails to maintain a 
balance between consolidation and specialization absent 
competitive incentives, or actively sacrifices that balance to 
foreclose competition; (2) lost innovation benefits from 
 
233 For example, when Facebook launched its live-streaming service, it 
“aggressively pushe[d] video to the top of newsfeeds while it [was] still live[] 
in an effort to encourage [user] interaction[.]” See Hern, supra note 168. 
Facebook’s prioritization of live-streaming on its main platform allowed it 
to crush the incumbent live-streaming app, Periscope. See id. 
234 See supra notes 115–138 and accompanying text. 
2018.3_OBEAR_FINAL  
1048 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
startups who cannot secure funding, or who tailor their apps 
and features to Facebook’s platform with the goal of 
acquisition; (3) higher attentional costs, in the form of more 
ads;235 and/or (4) higher prices for advertised goods, as higher 
advertising costs are passed on to consumers.236  
Despite the potential anticompetitive harms outlined 
above, current antitrust law lacks the tools to fully 
conceptualize copycatting as a form of exclusionary conduct; 
accordingly, a new exclusionary theory is needed.  
A. A Modern Alcoa? 
Because Facebook’s copycat campaign bears numerous 
facial similarities to the exclusionary conduct at issue in 
Alcoa, modern antitrust law may struggle to properly 
appreciate the resultant economic harms.  
In the social media business, new features and 
applications do not only represent new products, but also 
potentially new sources of demand. Companies compete not 
just for the current population of social media users, but also 
for the residual attention yet unclaimed by any social media 
platform.237 Especially where new features are novel and 
 
235 See Wu, supra note 21, for a discussion on how monopoly power 
allows attention brokers to subject consumers to more advertisement in 
exchange for the same amount of content; this increased advertising is the 
monopoly rent. The increased attentional cost paid by consumers is another 
form of product degradation. 
236 If Facebook uses copycatting as a strategy to preserve its monopoly, 
it can then continue to extract a monopoly rent either by increasing the 
advertising on its platform (extracting the rent directly from consumers by 
subjecting them to more ads in exchange for less content), or by charging 
higher prices to advertisers who find it necessary to use Facebook or else 
lose out to competitors who do use social media advertising. In a more 
competitive marketplace, those advertisers could take their business to a 
different social media platform that offered lower advertising rates. 
237 See Wu, supra note 21, at 24. New features and applications can pull 
attention from other commercial activities (such as watching television, or 
surfing the internet), or even capture attention from attentional 
“greenfields”—time and attention occupied by non-commercial providers 
such as “friends, family, hobbies, taking walks and so on.” Id. For example, 
live video streaming might inspire people to pull out their phones to record 
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untested, companies would be taking a substantial risk of 
losing users to their rivals by not copying the latest trend. 
These incentives help to explain why rapid innovation—the 
“Move Fast and Break Things” mentality—was so important 
to Facebook’s early growth strategy.  
From this perspective, “copying” in a social media market 
would represent nothing more than responding to the increase 
in demand for social media. Just as an aluminum company 
does not have a perfect supply and demand curve posted on 
the board room wall, social media companies have to engage 
in a bit of guesswork to determine where new demand will 
emerge, and how to “supply” that demand.238 But in the 
aluminum industry, the company that makes the best guess 
about new demand does not receive a legal monopoly over the 
increased demand—such a rule would corrupt the competitive 
process and prevent more efficient firms from entering the 
market.239 Insulating a social media firm from competition by 
preventing other companies from copying a new feature would 
similarly chill competition in the social media market. 
Therefore, to the extent that copying is analogized to 
competing for new increases in demand, copying is 
procompetitive because it allows more companies to compete 
for the users interested in a particular kind of application.  
 
something on their daily walk, and then continue to use their mobile device 
to watch for reactions and Likes. The potential to capture even some of that 
aggregated time might justify taking risks with new features and 
applications. 
238 Supply, in this analogy, would be a function of both feature 
availability and product design. 
239 Legal monopolies of this kind exist as a product of patent, copyright, 
and other forms of intellectual property law. The monopoly privileges are 
“intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products 
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
This Note does not advocate for extending intellectual property protections 
to app development, but rather suggests that antitrust law should 
scrutinize tech monopolists that have the ability and incentive to exploit 
copying as an anticompetitive strategy. 
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In Alcoa, however, the monopolist did not simply engage in 
guesswork about where new demand would emerge: Alcoa 
“stimulated demand and opened new uses for the metal, but 
not without making sure that it could supply what it had 
evoked.”240 The court thus found that Aloca proactively 
maintained its monopoly. Similarly, Facebook’s copycatting 
has arguably evolved past merely reacting to the market. 
Using Onavo, user analytics, and intensive monitoring of 
competitors, Facebook can craft new features and applications 
not only to fulfill demand, but also to stimulate it and guide 
its growth towards Facebook’s own platform. However, 
antitrust law certainly should not punish using advanced 
analytics to foresee demand, and Facebook would likely 
succeed in arguing that its conduct has procompetitive, pro-
consumer effects. 
Another argument against Facebook’s use of analytics is 
that it employs that information not to satiate new demand, 
but to manipulate new sources’ demand in order to preserve 
its monopoly in the current pool of social media users. 
Facebook has a different set of incentives compared to rival 
social media companies with regard to expanding the total 
number of social media users. While Facebook, like its 
competitors, would obviously like to capture these new users, 
it also has an interest in preventing its competitors from 
acquiring any new users because those new users help to build 
the competitors’ overall user networks, even if it came at a 
minor cost to Facebook’s own user growth. Allowing a rival 
social media company to expand its user network would also 
allow it to gradually overcome the network effect as a barrier 
to entry, placing it in a better position to compete for existing 
social media users.  
Therefore, Facebook has an incentive to adopt features and 
applications that sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer 
goodwill in order to prevent rival companies from gaining a 
network foothold. This logic explains Facebook’s recent 
 
240 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 
1945) (emphasis added). 
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“kitchen-sink approach”241 and its apathy towards balancing 
consolidation and specialization.242 Copying a new application 
or feature, like Stories on the Facebook app,243 might make 
little business sense in terms of product design and user 
experience, but Facebook nonetheless has an incentive to 
launch a version simply to ensure that it maintains the 
network dominance that supports its monopoly. Because such 
conduct would have the ancillary effects of degrading 
Facebook’s product and inhibiting innovation among its 
competitors,244 it produces cognizable antitrust harms. 
Viewed in this light, Facebook’s conduct goes beyond the 
exclusionary behavior in Alcoa. If Facebook is actually 
sacrificing its own product integrity and business interests in 
order to exploit network effects, then a plaintiff may be able 
to present a valid anticompetitive argument.  
If Alcoa was still controlling law, an antitrust case against 
Facebook might be fairly straightforward. Facebook’s 
copycatting, at minimum, shows that it “embrace[d] each new 
opportunity as it opened,” and “face[d] every newcomer with 
new capacity already geared into a great organization.”245 
Although it is no longer a controlling precedent, Alcoa 
provides a useful comparison for cognizing Facebook’s 
anticompetitive conduct and identifying how tech markets 
might function differently than traditional markets, such as 
those for aluminum ingot, by insulating user attrition from 
the effects of product degradation. Thus, we should hesitate to 
dismiss a theory of harm connected to Facebook’s copycat 
behavior simply because it superficially resembles Alcoa. 
However, with the more cautious approach of current 
antitrust law, proving that Facebook’s copying actually 
degrades its user experience may be exceedingly difficult, 
especially in light of the history of copying in the social media 
 
241 Feldman, supra note 16. 
242 See supra notes 228–233 and accompanying text. 
243 See Wagner, supra note 178 (“You don’t need Stories in four apps.”). 
244 Rival companies have less incentive to innovate if they know that 
Facebook’s copying will limit the number of users that they can hope to gain 
from their efforts. 
245 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431. 
2018.3_OBEAR_FINAL  
1052 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
industry and the volatility and general unpredictability of 
consumer trends. Facebook will likely present a compelling 
procompetitive narrative for its copycat campaign.  
B. Microsoft Revisited: Facebook’s Procompetitive 
Arguments 
Although Microsoft outlines a framework for assessing 
general exclusionary conduct in the tech market, that 
framework is unsuited to assess anticompetitive effects in the 
social media market where the primary consumer harms are 
caused by stifled innovation, product degradation, and, most 
significantly, non-monetary prices. Without traditional cash 
markets or concrete exclusionary theories to guide the 
analysis, a court may not be able to accurately assess the 
validity of a plaintiff’s anticompetitive arguments as against 
Facebook’s procompetitive justifications. Given the Microsoft 
court’s caution against false positives,246 an antitrust case 
against Facebook may be an uphill battle. 
As with Alcoa, under a Microsoft framework an antitrust 
plaintiff would first have to show that Facebook’s conduct has 
an anticompetitive effect. In addition to the above argument 
regarding Facebook’s kitchen-sink approach to copying, a 
plaintiff could also argue that Facebook’s copycat campaign 
has deliberately targeted startup companies and exploited a 
capital investment entry barrier. Although modern antitrust 
law has largely adopted the Chicago School position that 
capital requirements are not an entry barrier, the success of 
Facebook’s copycatting campaign in throttling investment to 
new startups247 suggests that this position might be worth 
reconsidering in tech markets that have substantial network 
effects.  
A social media startup trying to survive248 in the era of 
Facebook’s copycatting has several options: (1) design a 
 
246 See supra Section II.B.2.  
247 See supra notes 221–227 and accompanying text. 
248 Here, the word “survive” means that the company has the potential 
to realize a rate of return to justify capital investment. The word “survive” 
might be misleading, as many startups that fail to adopt one of the survival 
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product that avoids direct competition with Facebook and its 
suite of applications;249 (2) design a product with the goal of 
being acquired by Facebook; or (3) overcome the network 
effects entry barrier and compete with Facebook on a full 
scale. None of those options allow truly competitive, pro-
consumer entry into the social media market.  
The first option quite obviously does not put competitive 
pressure on Facebook, except to the extent that Facebook 
wants to expand beyond its current social media monopoly. 
Facebook should not receive any antitrust leniency simply 
because it only monopolizes one kind of market. The second 
option, acquisition, may prove profitable for some developers, 
but it also only permits a narrow band of innovation.250 In 
Microsoft, the court condemned similar efforts to keep 
developers focused on designing applications that worked on 
the Windows operating system.251 Here, the development 
strategy is even more limited, as Facebook has used Onavo 
and other tools to eliminate the need to outsource application 
development.252 The final option, overcoming network effects, 
would require creating an entirely new Facebook. While 
modern antitrust law assumes that firms can easily enter 
monopolized markets, Google+’s failure to overcome 
Facebook’s network effects—even with the weight of Google’s 
search monopoly, brand, arguably superior product, and 
platform’s integration with popular services like Gmail and 
 
strategies are simply never created in the first place. Instead, the threat of 
being copied removes the incentive to enter the market. 
249 For example, by designing a product with a closed network. Capital 
investment is more available for closed networks than it is for social media 
applications. See Dwoskin, supra note 16 (“Investors also now say they are 
eager to invest in closed networks that they think Facebook will not wade 
into—like social apps for distinct groups, such as health-care 
professionals—or ideas like blockchain, which would enable consumers to 
transfer their information without letting a large company become a hub of 
data.”). 
250 See supra text accompanying note 188.  
251 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 71–72. 
252 See Dwoskin, supra note 16 (“Facebook has curtailed [developer] 
access by limiting what third parties can do within Facebook and is building 
some of the same features on its own.”). 
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YouTube253—suggests that price theory assumptions may 
break down in tech markets with interlocking grids of network 
effects.  
Despite all of these anticompetitive arguments, Facebook 
still has a compelling procompetitive justification: product 
design. Fundamentally, all the forms of copycatting described 
in this Note have ultimately been design choices: which 
features and applications to include on Facebook, and which 
to ignore and exclude. The Microsoft court stressed the 
dangers of questioning product design choices, and only 
condemned Microsoft’s design choices where those choices 
generated exclusionary effects without “making Microsoft’s 
own browser more attractive to consumers.”254 Unlike some of 
Microsoft’s choices, Facebook’s product design decisions do not 
clearly lack a legitimate business motive. The copied features 
and applications are attractive to at least some consumers, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the innovating rivals had 
enough success with these features to warrant Facebook’s 
attention. Facebook can argue that its design choices are 
merely aimed at catering to these consumer preferences, a 
pro-consumer behavior that the antitrust law ought to 
encourage.  
This argument is undercut by Facebook’s demonstrated 
paranoia towards any competitive threat. Following the 
Google+ war, Facebook’s copying strategy, at least towards 
startup developers, showed a significant shift away from 
symbiotic cooperation and toward anticompetitive stagnation. 
Recall the reports of former Facebook executives and 
employees regarding Zuckerberg’s sensitivity towards 
disruptive startups,255 along with Facebook’s recent shift to 
restrict third-party developers.256 When paired with 
Facebook’s increasing bloat,257 these reports suggest that 
Facebook may no longer be copying applications to respond to 
 
253 See Martínez, supra note 194 and accompanying text (noting that 
Google+ had better photo sharing, a cleaner design, and no ads). 
254 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65. 
255 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  
256 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
257 See Wagner, supra note 178. 
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consumer trends and to maximize user experience, but rather 
to quash potential competitors. 
Unfortunately, without concrete evidence that Facebook’s 
conduct has resulted in higher prices for consumers or 
advertisers, or intentionally subverted competitors in the way 
that Microsoft sabotaged Java, the circumstantial evidence 
regarding Facebook’s copycatting intent is likely insufficient 
to establish antitrust liability.258 The best argument, under 
Microsoft, might be that Facebook’s overall course of conduct 
has generated significant anticompetitive harms that 
outweigh any procompetitive benefits of Facebook offering its 
own versions of every conceivable application and feature. 
However, this solution is not workable: the evidence required 
to establish liability would probably not outweigh modern 
antitrust law’s aversion to false positives. Even if it did, the 
process might take so long that the competitive marketplace 
would have completely changed by the time a court imposed 
liability. This in turn would undercut the effectiveness of any 
potential remedies, or even discourage plaintiffs, private or 
public, from bringing litigation in the first place.259 Antitrust 
law needs a way to quickly cognize and quantify intangible 
anticompetitive harms from product degradation and 
diminished innovation in tech markets. One way to 
 
258 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (“[I]n considering whether the 
monopolist’s conduct on balance harms competition and is therefore 
condemned as exclusionary for purposes of § 2, our focus is upon the effect 
of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it. Evidence of the intent behind 
the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us 
understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s conduct.”). 
259 See id. at 49 (“As the record in this case indicates, six years seems 
like an eternity in the computer industry. By the time a court can assess 
liability, firms, products, and the marketplace are likely to have changed 
dramatically. This, in turn, threatens enormous practical difficulties for 
courts considering the appropriate measure of relief in equitable 
enforcement actions, both in crafting injunctive remedies in the first 
instance and reviewing those remedies in the second. Conduct remedies 
may be unavailing in such cases, because innovation to a large degree has 
already rendered the anticompetitive conduct obsolete (although by no 
means harmless). And broader structural remedies present their own set of 
problems, including how a court goes about restoring competition to a 
dramatically changed, and constantly changing, marketplace.”). 
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accomplish this might be to narrow the antitrust inquiry with 
a new concrete exclusionary theory: predatory copying. 
C. The Predatory Copying Framework 
A predatory copying framework would allow robust 
antitrust enforcement in tech markets by accounting for the 
intangible harms of copycatting while simultaneously 
protecting legitimate procompetitive copying from liability. 
While general exclusionary theories might capture some 
copycat conduct, Facebook’s copycatting campaign 
demonstrates that it might be extremely difficult to win 
copying claims on a timeline that would provide adequate 
remedies. Revising the exclusionary jurisprudence to reflect 
the hidden costs of copycatting and facilitate speedier 
enforcement would require greater consideration of a 
monopolist’s intent.  
A predatory copying doctrine would create a presumption 
of anticompetitive harm when a plaintiff provides prima facie 
evidence that: (1) a predatory firm’s market structure 
plausibly incentivizes copying for reasons other than 
competition on the merits; (2) the alleged copying 
substantially forecloses competition in the relevant market; 
and (3) the copying was motivated by exclusionary purposes.  
There are several reasons in favor of presuming 
anticompetitive harms under these conditions. First, as 
established above, the evidentiary burden to prove that 
copying decreases innovation effectively preempts copying 
claims under general exclusionary theories because the 
innovation costs are substantially borne by companies that 
have never entered the market.260 The deterrent effect of 
copying poses far greater potential harms to innovation than 
any exclusionary effect toward existing competitors. 
 
260 See Dwoskin, supra note 16 (“[I]nterviews with two dozen top 
investors and entrepreneurs suggest [Facebook’s copying] is having a 
profound impact on innovation in Silicon Valley, by creating a strong 
disincentive for investors and start-ups to put money and effort into 
creating products Facebook might copy.”). 
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Second, once a monopolist establishes a reputation for 
copying, this reputation can create a psychological deterrent, 
which may outlast the market conditions that facilitate the 
effectiveness of the predatory copying.261 Such a reputation 
could continue to depress competitive conditions, outlasting 
the market conditions that provide the evidentiary proof of 
exclusion. 
Third, in order to mitigate against false positives, a 
substantial foreclosure requirement largely limits the 
doctrine’s reach to those markets where predatory copying 
exploits network effects or other entry barriers.262 Finally, the 
markets where monopolists have anticompetitive incentives 
to copy and where that copying can foreclose substantial 
competition—namely, tech markets that have network 
effects—may also be markets where monopolists have access 
to substantial market analytics to rebut an established 
presumption. These factors help justify giving intent a greater 
weight in the exclusionary analysis.  
When applied to Facebook, the predatory copying 
framework creates a presumption that Facebook’s copycatting 
generates anticompetitive harms. First, as established above, 
Facebook has an incentive to copy its rivals’ features and 
applications in order to prevent competitors from gaining a 
network foothold, even if copying would sacrifice the integrity 
of Facebook’s main product. Second, the aggregate of 
Facebook’s copycatting conduct likely forecloses a substantial 
portion of the social media market. Because existing social 
media users are often locked into Facebook by network 
effects,263 the main way for competitors to establish a network 
 
261 See Ip, supra note 16. Facebook’s copying of Snapchat’s Stories 
feature serves as a cautionary tale for potential competitors: “Snap’s shares 
have sunk below the price at which the company went public last March as 
losses have mounted, which won’t encourage new entrants. Once a company 
like Google or Facebook has critical mass, ‘the venture capital looks 
elsewhere.’” Ip, supra note 16. 
262 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 69 (noting that substantial foreclosure 
tests can help screen out false positives). 
263 See Waller, supra note 21, at 1788 (“Facebook benefits from a host 
of both direct and indirect network effects. The sheer number of users in the 
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foothold is to introduce apps and features that either increase 
the total pool of social media users or capture a new 
attentional greenfield among existing users. Where Facebook 
launches its own application to compete for these new sources 
of demand, there is little risk of anticompetitive harm because 
Facebook’s new app would have less of a network advantage. 
But when Facebook integrates the new feature into the main 
Facebook platform, that integration raises the possibility that 
Facebook is sacrificing its user experience by over-
consolidating its platform.264 Finally, evidence of Facebook’s 
exclusionary intent, such as Facebook’s covert use of Onavo to 
spy on competitors,265 Facebook’s attempts to intimidate 
rivals into acquisition,266 and testimony from former 
Facebook employees about Facebook’s copycat philosophy,267 
satisfies the final predatory copying prong. 
Finally, Facebook is in a good position to rebut a predatory 
copying charge if it can proffer evidence that it adopted an 
alleged copied feature for purely legitimate business reasons. 
While its acquisition of Onavo may cut against Facebook in 
terms of exclusionary intent, the analytics provided by Onavo 
and Facebook’s own extensive data collection could show that 
Facebook had reasonable grounds to believe that a given 
feature or app would improve the user experience or help 
monetize existing attention pools. Although Facebook and 
other predatory copiers might obscure or downplay their 
internal data that might reveal exclusionary intent,268 the 
predatory copying framework still increases the probability of 
a successful antitrust suit, and thereby deters at least the 
most blatant offenses. 
 
system is the most obvious such effect and makes its network immensely 
more valuable than any of its competitors.”). 
264 See Wagner, supra note 178. 
265 See Dwoskin, supra note 16. 
266 See, e.g., Morris & Seetharaman, supra note 25 (discussing 
Facebook’s course of conduct towards potential rival Houseparty). 
267 See supra note 178. 
268 For example, if Facebook’s internal analysis predicted that 
integrating a new application would harm user retention. 
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The predatory copying framework thus provides a sensible 
and workable balance between identifying the 
anticompetitive harms associated with predatory copying 
while mitigating the risks of false positive prosecutions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although price theory and Schumpeterian models of 
competition provide an optimistic outlook for sustained 
competition and creative destruction in winner-take-all 
industries like social media, antitrust law cannot grow 
complacent towards these markets. Twentieth-century 
antitrust frameworks and modes of analysis may fail to keep 
pace with the dynamism and innovative business models 
within high tech industries, especially those that challenge 
traditional understandings of monetary costs and consumer 
harms. A predatory copying framework would allow courts to 
cognize otherwise intangible anticompetitive harms, such as 
product degradation and stifled innovation, that antitrust law 
currently neglects in the attentional economy. By focusing the 
anticompetitive inquiry on market incentives, substantial 
foreclosure, and anticompetitive intent, the framework gives 
antitrust plaintiffs a fighting chance to challenge the new 
kinds of exclusionary strategies employed by tech monopolists 
such as Facebook.  
As people continue to integrate technology deeper into 
their daily lives, the economic and societal stakes of protecting 
competition rise higher and higher. The caution and hesitancy 
of the past thirty years of antitrust enforcement are outdated 
and ill-suited to address these challenges. Courts should not 
stand in the way of a robust antitrust law that challenges 
unwarranted consolidations of power and prevents 
entrenched monopolies. When it comes to protecting 
innovation in the markets, courts should not be afraid of a 
little bit of innovation in the law.  
